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Abstract 
The thesis is concerned with accelerated procedures to determine asylum 
claims in the UK.  It applies UK Home Office policy and legislation, along 
with EU law and legislation read in conjunction with the treaties outlining 
the UK’s international obligations to the realities that detainees experience 
when routed onto the procedure.  The study finds that the signing of the 
Treaty of Lisbon in 2009 reignites the debate concerning the meaning and 
scope of EU principles.  It suggests that the resulting strengthened principle 
of proportionality and necessity renders unnecessary detention allowed 
currently by the UK procedure a violation of article 5(1)(f)ECHR.  A similar 
conclusion is reached concerning the EU right to an effective remedy, 
highlighting the short time-limit set by the Government particularly in terms 
of the appeals procedure, and arguing that it is contrary to the basic principles 
of EU law.  The thesis also highlights other shortcomings within the 
procedure, pointing to insufficient screening and safeguarding, as well as 
incorrect use of the set accelerated criteria.  The study concludes by noting 
the general inefficiency of the Home Office to remove failed applicants once 
the procedure is ended, suggesting that the applicants are often held for a 
period which is longer than necessary. 
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1 Introduction 
The UK is one of the only countries in Europe that indefinitely detains asylum seekers in 
detention centres across the country in conditions at times akin to a category B prison.  
What’s more, for 14 years the UK Government has further developed a system in addition to 
general detention entitled ‘The Detained Fast Track’ (DFT), which allows detention using 
broader criteria for administrative convenience.  This has the affect that almost any asylum 
applicant is eligible for detention if their claim can be decided quickly.  The DFT process 
started on one site, and now operates across at least four.  The use of the DFT is also rising, 
and has done dramatically in the last year: between 2012 and 2013, the numbers on the DFT 
almost doubled, increasing by 73% (see Appendix 1).  With the expansion of the system, the 
conditions and criteria have also developed, moving from a 7-day maximum detention stay, 
to an average of a month to complete just the first stage.  This thesis will examine the DFT as 
it is in 2014, identifying areas where it is failing and suggesting implicated areas of illegality 
and article breaches. 
The essay will first discuss the background context to this area, it will then describe the 
approach taken when researching the topic.  Chapter 4 will focus on the background to the 
DFT and its justification.  The study will then move on to specific examples arising from the 
application of policy to the DFT: Chapter 5 discusses the issues surrounding entry and entry 
criteria to the DFT; Chapter 6 explains the issues affecting legal advice; Chapter 7 outlines 
the problems related to the fast track appeals process; Chapter 8 identifies the scheme’s 
ability to be flexible where appropriate to avoid wrongful routing onto the DFT; Chapter 9 
explains the conditions detainees are held at the present time, and Chapter 10 discusses the 
issues facing asylum applicants in continued detention once the DFT procedure has finished.  
The study then concludes by suggesting recommendations for improvement to the procedure. 
2 Analytical Framework 
The thesis concerns both well established and emerging areas relating to the fast track system 
operated in the UK.  It examines the inconsistencies that may be found between Home Office 
policy, and its applications in practice.   
EU legislation in the context of asylum issues has been built up with a view to standardise 
European Member States’ handling of asylum seekers.  The Common European Asylum 
System (or CEAS) consists of legislation detailing minimum standards of conduct to this end.  
The legal basis for the standardisation can be found in article 78 of the Treaty on Functioning 
of Europe (TFEU).  The UK has opted in to some of this legislation, though it has been 
accused of cherry-picking the legislation (Costello and Hancox, 2014).  With a focus on 
accelerated procedures, the UK was criticised for taking too wide an interpretation of some 
articles within the legislation (European Commission, COM (2010) 456, COM (2007) 745).  
What’s more, the legislation it has opted out of within the CEAS, mean that the UK may 
currently operating a system below the minimum standards accepted by the EU in some 
respects (Buckley, 2011). 
The signing of the Treaty of Lisbon (ToL) by the UK in 2009 has strengthened the legal 
status of the EU Charter (Piris, 2010), and therefore encouraged debate concerning its impact 
regarding standardised minimum procedures within the EU.  Whilst Member States remain 
autonomous, the articles within certain signed treaties may evolve to encompass wider (or 
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narrower) scope.  This may ultimately impact on aspects of the UK’s accelerated procedures.  
This is because the principles inherent within the Charter are visible in the articles.  For 
example, the principles of proportionality and necessity, Moreno-Lax argues, therefore 
should be applied to accelerated procedures, which ultimately questions the very idea of 
deprivation of liberty for administrative gain (2011).  The idea is explored whether, in light of 
this, these strengthened principles will ultimately mean standardisation within CEAS, even 
for the UK.  Some remain clear that Member States will not be impacted in this way (Rhee, 
2011).  However, the rise in the importance proportionality and necessity may give rise to 
unlawful detention claims of those placed on accelerated procedures. 
The derived principles have also sparked debate concerning the balance between fairness and 
speed and what constitutes a minimum standards with regards to this is also being debated.  
The principle of effectiveness and the EU right to an effective remedy could well have an 
impact on the UK-run accelerated procedure in the future (Reneman, 2014).  The JCHR 
highlight that procedures should not be operated that restrict the essence of the rights in 
question (JCHR, 2007).  This could impact on time-limits that have been set in the procedure, 
as well as access to legal aid. 
Finally, there is much literature from UK-based NGOs, independent reports and national case 
law criticising the way the Home Office applies its accelerated policy to the UK (Detention 
Action, 2011).  With a recently opened parliamentary inquiry into the use of detention 
(Porticullus House, July 2014), the issue is becoming more mainstream within UK politics, 
due to the apparent similarities applied to asylum seekers and criminals serving time in the 
UK (Oral evidence, [Chakrabarti] 2014).  The deficiencies have also attracted international 
criticism (UNHCR, 2012), (UNCAT, 2013). 
Within this context, it is not yet likely that the Government will change its accelerated 
policies that fall in part arguably below EU minimum standards.  This thesis seeks to link 
practical knowledge of the system operating on the ground to emerging and accepted 
principles of EU law, as well as studying the application of the Home Office’s own policy 
with a view to argue that it should. 
3 Methodology 
The approach chosen to carry out this research has primarily been inductive (Bryman, 2004: 
10), with the observations and findings gathered which influenced the final conclusions 
drawn. However, as is accepted by Bryman (Bryman, 2004: 9), my research also employs an 
element of deduction.  This is because, although a possible general theory was known before 
gathering data (that the study would result in recommendations to the Home Office to 
improve the DFT in the UK), the exact recommendations (and impact the study would have 
on the findings) were not known at the beginning of research.   
Qualitative data, in the form of interviews with legal practitioners, was a key approach in the 
research.  In addition, analysis of quantitative data in the form of official Home Office 
statistics and Freedom of Information requests were used. Furthermore, research of the latest 
case law and emerging academic ideas aided understanding in an ever developing field.  
These approaches were taken together as both theoretical and practical knowledge were 
needed to give a rounded view of the true state in which the UK immigration system finds 
itself in 2014. 
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In light of this, elements of grounded theory have been used in order to analyse the data.  As 
is characteristic of grounded theory, analysis and data collection developed simultaneously 
(Hodkinson, 2008: 84).  Despite the general conception before research began that the Home 
Office would need to make improvements in this area, this was not the starting point to 
research, rather, as research started, it was important that methods were flexible so that the 
knowledge gained informed the next step in research, allowing analysis to be ongoing and 
affecting the specific questions being asked, with no predetermining agenda.  There was 
therefore a constant shift between focussed data collection and further data analysis. 
However, most importantly, the use of coding was used throughout the project in order to be 
in a position to effectively compare the different challenges facing the immigration system as 
it is now.  Conceptual labels such as “flexibility” and “screening” were placed on transcripts, 
quantitative data and academic research in order to build a platform of integration capable of 
comparing different elements of the system.  This eventually formed the basis of the structure 
of this thesis, in a process of selective coding.  Although there are drawbacks to the grounded 
approach; coding can detract from the bigger picture, too much order in the research method 
can result in limiting a holistic and creative approach to analysis, and, as is clear, it was not 
possible to completely nullify bias (Hodkinson, 2008).  However, these drawbacks have been 
minimised due to the fact that elements of grounded theory have been applied to both 
qualitative and quantitative data, and cross referenced with the academic literature in order to 
draw conclusions and recommendations, triangulating the findings in a mixed method 
approach (Alexander et al., 2008: 128). 
Concerns relating to the collection of quantitative data published by the Home Office, such as 
reliability and validity of the data (Bryman, 2004: 211) and misinterpretation were considered 
throughout the research.  The statistics were not taken at face value, although the study was 
aimed to capture a snapshot of how the system was working in 2014; the up-to-date figures 
which, importantly, the Home Office agreed with, proved vital to the process of triangulation 
and added to the argument throughout.  What’s more, the unobtrusive nature of the data 
(Webb et al., 1966), eliminating any Home Office reactivity which may manipulate the 
findings, strengthened this case.  Rhetoric (Bryman, 2004: 490) was employed in a 
responsible way as a means to decide which parts of the data to show, and how to display it 
(e.g. bar chart, line graph, table).   
The qualitative research conducted is an essential part of the research conducted.  Concurring 
with Miller and Glassner, it is convincing that this type of research would have the capability 
to ‘provide a mirror reflection’ (1997: 100) of the field in question, as it is impossible to 
depart from the artificial situation of an interview, though this is still an invaluable 
opportunity to gain unique knowledge.  Within the research itself, it was vital to talk and 
listen to those on the frontline working with clients experiencing the research area in order to 
apply the laws and policies to what was realistically happening in everyday life. 
Three interviews were conducted: two solicitors and one barrister (see appendix 2-4 for 
transcripts).  One interview took place in a venue chosen by the interviewee, two other 
interviews took place over the phone, on the interviewees’ requests.  In addition, a fourth 
informal telephone conversation was conducted with a prominent academic in the field.  The 
interviews were conducted as per the six stages set out by Legard et al (2003: 145).  In the 
very beginning a consent form was discussed and signed/consent was given to the interviewer 
under a strict basis of anonymity, confidentiality, and the unpublished nature of the thesis 
(see appendix 5-7 for consent forms).  A reassurance was given to the interviewee that they 
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could decide not to answer a question or to stop the interview all together if they so wished.  
All interviews were recorded on two different devices and typed up.   
Questions were chosen carefully in line with the inductive theory to be open-ended and 
unbiased, though still focussed on the area of research.  As such, a variety of content mapping 
questions coupled with content mining questions (prompts and probes) were used (Legard et 
al., 2003).  At times, clarification techniques were used on technical points of law.   
Finally, a request for an interview with Home Secretary Theresa May, Immigration Minister 
Damian Green or one of their associates was turned down by the Home Office (see Appendix 
8 for email exchange).  Parliament held an oral evidence session as part of an Inquiry into the 
use of Immigration Detention on 17th July which I attended, and obtained the official 
transcript.  This is useful when referring in the thesis to the practical realities of the research 
focus.   
4 Background: UK Accelerated Procedures 
4.1 The Detained Fast Track (DFT) 
For more than a decade the UK Government have been detaining asylum seekers whilst their 
claim is decided, and then (in the event of a negative decision) to carry out their removal 
from the UK.  This procedure is called the Detained Fast Track (DFT), and applicants are 
accepted onto the scheme if their claim is likely to be one which can be decided quickly.  The 
UK Government therefore detains DFT-routed asylum seekers in this way at the initial stage 
of applying for asylum.  If the claim is deemed to be more complicated, the applicant is 
allowed to wait for a decision in the community, with the Government supporting the 
applicants with financial and accommodation support.   
The DFT programme has expanded quickly over the last decade, and there is much dispute 
over the lawfulness of the procedure due to its changing operation policies and expansion.  
This section of research identifies the justification for the DFT and the areas within the DFT 
which may make the operation unlawful.   
4.2 History: Justification for DFT 
UK statutory law does not prohibit detention in order to process accelerated procedures, or 
detention for administrative ease.  EU legislation allows for accelerated procedures, though 
with some limitations.  
Under UK law, the power to detain for the purposes of the accelerated DFT procedure 
(although this provision also allows detention outside the DFT under other criteria) is granted 
under paragraph 16 of Schedule 2 to the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 1971: 
"(1) A person who may be required to submit to examination 
under paragraph 2 above may be detained under the authority 
of an immigration officer pending his examination and pending 
a decision to give or refuse him leave to enter 
(2) If there are reasonable grounds for suspecting that a person 
is someone in respect of whom directions may be given under 
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any of paragraphs 8 to 10A or 12 to 14, that person may be 
detained under the authority of an immigration officer 
pending— 
 (a) a decision whether or not to give such directions; 
 (b) his removal in pursuance of such directions." 
This legislation does not bar the Government from operating accelerated timescales for 
deciding claims, although it is silent on guidance on what detention is proportionate and 
allowed.   
The Human Rights Act 1998 (HRA) came into force in the UK in October 2000, writing the 
European Convention of Human Rights (ECHR) into UK legislation.  Article 5(1)(f)ECHR 
(identical to article 5 of HRA) permits ‘the lawful arrest or detention of a person to prevent 
his effecting an unauthorised entry into the country or of a person against whom action is 
being taken with a view to deportation or extradition’, with article 5(2) ordering the reasons 
of detention to be made known promptly, and article 5(4) outlines the right to speedily 
challenge the lawfulness of detention. 
Before the introduction of the DFT, detention by the Government was considered something 
that should be limited to the ‘shortest possible time’ (Home Office, 1998: 49), and general 
criteria to detain was identified as: imminent removal, absconding risk or initially to establish 
basis of a claim or identity (Home Office, 1998: 48).  The “last resort nature” of these criteria 
was upheld by ex parte B ([1997] EWHC Admin 1148), highlighting the need for diligent 
reappraisal by the Home Office with regards to detention criteria at that time. 
The change in this policy apparently came with the decision to detain in order to accelerate 
the process, considered by ministers in 1999 as a last resort in the circumstances of an 
unprecedented 7,000 asylum applicants a month.  The DFT therefore initially began in 2000, 
on a single site called Oakington.  Applicants routed through the DFT were brought to 
Oakington and held on the site whilst their claims were speedily decided.  There were 
solicitors on site every day of the week and applicants were held in the estate for an average 
of 7-10 days as their claim was decided.  If (as was usual) a negative decision was given, 
applicants were released into the community for the next stage in their appeals process, or 
whilst the Government took steps with a view to their removal.  This was hailed as a more 
effective and time efficient way to deal with the unprecedented number of asylum 
applications coming in (Detention Action, 2011).  In 2000, the change to the detention 
criteria was described by the government:  
‘in addition to the existing detention criteria, applicants will be detained at 
Oakington where it appears that their application can be decided quickly, 
including those which may be certified as manifestly unfounded...Detention 
will initially be for a period of about seven days to enable applicants to be 
interviewed and an initial decision to be made’ (Hansard, HC 16 March 2000, 
col 263W). 
The new policy, although (through silence of the legislation) not strictly prohibited by 
relevant UK legislation, added an administrative (speedy) dimension to detention criteria in 
order to solve backlog of claims.  The absence of necessity in the decision to detain was new. 
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The DFT policy was challenged at the High Court in 2001 in R (Saadi and others) v 
Secretary of State for the Home Department (SSHD)  ([2001] EWHC Admin 670), and found 
to be unlawful; it was found that the true reasons behind detention at Oakington breached 
article 5(1)(f)ECHR, concluding that detention in absence of necessity was unlawful’ (para 
45), deciding that the Government were not attempting to prevent unauthorised entry, but 
intending only to reach a speedy decision. 
This ruling was overturned at the House of Lords in S (Saadi) v SSHD ([2002] UKHL 41), 
with the court holding that 1 week of detention for a claim to be processed quickly, in the 
circumstances of an unprecedented number of asylum claims to the UK, did not need to be 
“necessary” to be compatible with the first part of article 5(1)(f); the short period of detention 
was found to be reasonable.  One year later, Nadarajah v SSHD ([2003] EWCA Civ 1768) 
confirmed that published UK policy to detain immigrants dictated what detention was lawful.  
In the same year, an extension of the DFT process was announced by Beverly Hughes, 
confirming it would include an appeals process (Hansard HC, Col 42WS, 18 March 2003).  
Following this announcement, the fast track appeals process was introduced1, which 
permitted a 2 day time limit to appeal a refusal, amended for the last time in 2005 (Rules SI 
2005 No. 560) to apply to those detained on the DFT in Colnbrook Immigration Removal 
Centre (IRC), Harmondsworth IRC, Campsfield IRC and Yarl’s Wood IRC.  The attachment 
of the appeals process lengthened the time period in detention to about a month.  The 
timetable of the new DFT procedure, published by the Home Office, projects a 22-day stay in 
detention whilst the process is completed (see Appendix 9).   
Once these changes had been made, The European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) 
examined the legality of detaining for accelerated procedures and administrative convenience 
in Saadi v UK (GC, 13229/03)2 in 2008 in the Grand Chamber, holding that accelerated 
procedures were lawful as it was in the interests of both parties and was proportionate to the 
problem of a back log of claims, and therefore compatible with article 5(1)(f)ECHR.  The 
judges examined the procedure not as it was operated at the time (2008) but as it was 
operated in 2001 in Oakington.  Conclusions were drawn on this basis, such as: a ‘short 
period of detention is not an unreasonable price to pay in order to ensure the speedy 
resolution of the claims of a substantial proportion of this influx’ (para. 17).   
However, this decision was extremely controversial, resulting in a majority vote of only 11 to 
6 finding no violation of article 5(1)(f).  The 6 judges disagreeing with this decision, 
explained that it was a dangerous stance to take that detention of any kind was of benefit to 
an applicant.  In their dissenting opinion, they also expressed concern that if the DFT was 
upheld as carrying no violation, it would be more difficult to detect unlawful detention in the 
future: ‘if a seven-day period of detention is not considered excessive, where and how do we 
draw the line for what is unacceptable?’.  It emerged from the case that the principles that 
could be applied to the decision to detain on the DFT should meet the following principles: 
detention must be in good faith, it must be closely connected to unlawful entry, the place and 
conditions of detention were appropriate and detention did not exceed that which was 
reasonably required. 
                                                          
1 Initially applying to those detained in Harmondsworth IRC in 2003, then expanding to include Colnbrook IRC 
and Campsfield IRC with emergency legislation following a disturbance at Harmondsworth in 2004, and 
eventually including Yarl’s Wood IRC in 2005 
2 Hereafter: Saadi 
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Indeed, this pertinent question of the dissenting judges underpinned the issues alluded to in 
the Grand Chamber: the wider implications of the decision are important.  With such a 
controversial history, the operation of the DFT splits experts in terms of the legality of its 
operation in 2014.  The Home Office maintains currently that its policy is in the interests of 
both the detainees and the Government as the claims are to be decided quickly.  This view is 
echoed by Justice Ouseley in Detention Action v SSHD3 ([2014] EWHC 2245)4, as one 
important reason why the principle is lawful.  However, many still agree with the original 
dissenting decision.  O’Nions notes the Saadi decision to render the DFT legal is 
problematic; by allowing techniques involving short-term detention for administrative 
convenience rules out “necessity” as a requirement which arguably allows for the procedure 
to expand and introduce arbitrary detention of asylum seekers (O’Nions, 2008).   
4.3 International concerns  
The DFT seems also to run contrary to the standards set in international law, relevant to the 
treaties ratified by the UK.  UNHCR Guidelines on detention detail principles that should be 
adhered to when taking the decision to detain.  Guideline 4 confirms that the power to detain 
should only be used ‘as an exceptional measure’ (UNHCR, 2012: 16).  The guidelines accept 
that accelerated procedures are needed in some cases, but their criteria to accept applicants 
onto these processes are much higher than those of the UK: 
‘Any detention in connection with accelerated procedures should 
only be applied to cases that are determined to be “manifestly 
unfounded” or “clearly abusive”; and those detained are entitled 
to the protections outlined in these Guidelines’ (UNHCR, 2012: 
17). 
Indeed there are many guidelines issued by the UNHCR contrary to the UK’s actions, though 
‘States do not always regard these as sufficient authority’ (Lambert, 2012: 328).  There are 
also other international obligations for the UK that are contrary to the DFT procedure.  
Article 9(1) of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) protects 
against ‘arbitrary detention’, while article 31(1) of the 1951 Refugee Convention prohibits 
imposing penalties on account of their illegal entry, as well as only permitting that which is 
‘necessary’ (article 31(2)).  Article 14(2) of the UDHR prohibits the right to asylum to be 
invoked ‘contrary to the purposes and principles of the United Nations’.  It is clear that the 
precedent set by Saadi is below this threshold, which clearly requires the principle of 
necessity.  Moreno-Lax questions whether ‘it is permissible today for the European 
Convention on human Rights to provide a lower level of protection than that which is 
recognised and accepted in other organisations’ (2011: 187). 
Although the ECHR provides the most comprehensive guidelines as to how accelerated 
procedures should be organised, and therefore the Saadi decision and ECHR interpretation is 
the more important and relevant to inform UK operations, it still must be remembered that the 
                                                          
3 Hereafter: DA 
4 This recent judgment found that the DFT as it was operating currently was so unfair that it was unlawful, and 
set out several ways in which this unfairness could be eradicated, making the process fairer; these broadly 
included the detention of vulnerable applicants on the DFT and the safeguarding procedures against it, the 
access to legal advice, and the initial interview between the applicant and the Home Office (called the 
screening interview).  The judge ruled that an improvement in one of these aspects would render the process 
to be operating lawful again. 
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principles of EU law arise from international documents, taking inspiration from the 
intentions of common themes recognised in international agreements such as international 
treaties.  From reading the international articles relevant to restriction of freedom in the case 
of asylum, necessity emerges clearly, raising questions regarding the ever-growing DFT 
procedures. 
4.4 EU law and legislation 
It is arguable that the entering into force of the Treaty of Lisbon (ToL) brings greater clarity 
to the principles of necessity and proportionality, which would undermine decision taken in 
Saadi. 
The UK signed the Treaty in 2009, making the European Charter of Fundamental Rights and 
Freedoms ([EU] Charter) legally binding on the UK in article 6(1)5.  Article 6 of the Charter 
reaffirms that ‘everyone has the right to liberty’, and Title VII emphasises the need for 
proportionality and necessity read in conjunction with the relevant conventions: ‘subject to 
the principle of proportionality, limitations may be made only if they are necessary and 
genuinely meet objectives of general interest’ (article 52(1)).  Article 53 further instructs on 
how EU law may be interpreted: ‘nothing in this Charter shall be interpreted as restricting or 
adversely affecting human rights and fundamental freedoms’.  The Lisbon Treaty reiterates 
this principle of limitations on interpretation, reaffirming: ‘The rights, freedoms and 
principles in the Charter shall be interpreted in accordance with the general provisions in 
Title VII of the Charter governing its interpretation and application and with due regard to the 
explanations referred to in the Charter’ (article 6(1)).   
Applying this principle, as per article 6(1)ToL, read together with the relevant internationally 
ratified documents, as well as the EU provisions on asylum, article 52(1) of the Charter 
requires a binding principle of necessity to be applied to the reasons for detention.  Further, 
article 53 of the Charter affirms a principle binding on states which restricts interpretations 
that adversely affects human rights.  Indeed, looking back to the point made by the dissenting 
judges in Saadi, this principle adds weight to their opinion that although a speedy decision is 
in the interests of both parties, detention cannot be in the interests of asylum seekers.  With 
the binding force of the Charter, detention in order to acquire a speedy decision could be 
adversely affecting human rights and fundamental freedoms, contrary to the rights protected 
in article 5ECHR.   
Moreno-Lax also maintains that the Saadi decision threatens the principles of necessity and 
proportionality gained when reading the EU Charter and Lisbon Treaty in conjunction with 
the ECHR (Moreno-Lax, 2011).   This casts doubt on the hugely expanded DFT procedures, 
which have arguably moved too far away from that accepted in Saadi, meaning that the now 
                                                          
5 The UK also drafted what was initially a ‘self-proclaimed opt-out’ (O’Neill, 2011) called Protocol 30, to try to 
minimise the impact that the now binding EU Charter would have on national law.  The Protocol was also 
signed by Poland.  There is dispute as to whether the Protocol in effect works as an opt-out; article 1(1) merely 
states that the EU Charter should not allow EU courts to find domestic legislation incompatible with the 
Charter.  However, the Charter’s scope only falls within the scope of EU law, and so this particular legislation 
should already be in line with that required by the UK’s binding EU legislation.  This was confirmed in NS v 
SSHD (C-411/10) when it was ruled that the Protocol did not prevent the Charter applying to the UK, but 
instead explained its effect (para. 8).  Article 1(2) of the Charter may still act as a partial opt-out with concern 
to Title IV Charter rights, but these articles do not broadly concern asylum issues.  It is therefore concluded 
that this Protocol would not likely not significantly affect the way in which the Charter is applied to the UK. 
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much prolonged detention of applicants on the DFT could possibly be unlawful on necessity 
and proportionality grounds. It is suggested that this essentially requires member states to 
comply with EU detention rules with proportionality and necessity as strict principles to any 
decision to detain, rendering unnecessary detention for the purposes of the DFT unlawful.  
The discussion in subsequent chapters will explore what this principle of proportionality and 
necessity means when applied to certain operations within the DFT. 
The Common European Asylum System (CEAS) is a series of EU initiatives to help Member 
States improve and/or standardise minimum procedures relating to issues arising when 
receiving asylum seekers across the EU.  The Directives have recently been recast, though the 
UK have opted out of the improved legislation.  The recast Directives would force the UK to 
change the way in which the DFT is operated in a number of ways. However, it traditionally 
remains the UK’s choice as to whether it wishes to opt-in to the enhanced protections offered 
in order for international standardisation to occur with respect to asylum issues. 
The legal basis for the CEAS can be found in in article 78 of the Treaty of the Functioning of 
Europe (TFEU), stating the aspects under which a common framework can be worked towards.  
The CEAS comprises of 5 main components.  Those most relevant here are the Procedures 
(concerning the decision-making process), and Reception (concerning the conditions asylum 
seekers are held in) Directives6, but not their improved recast versions7.   
Controversy has arisen since it was apparent that the UK was planning not to opt in to the 
recast Directives.  One reason for this was that the enhanced Directives set out further 
improve minimum standards required to satisfy Member State obligations, and corrected 
some ‘inconsistencies’ (Hailbronner, 2010: 1258).  It was even debated whether, after the 
introduction of the recast Directives, the original ones would still apply to the UK; the UK 
Government position was initially not in favour of this point.  However, it was eventually 
decided in 2012 that the original Directives would still apply (Costello and Hancox, 2014), as 
was in line with the European Commission position (though with a warning that cherry-
picking EU legislation was not suitable).  However, there were some that still felt that the 
system had to be adopted as a whole to achieve its stated goal (Buckley, 2011). 
Indeed, this becomes more apparent when looking at the reasons why the recast Directives 
were written; in order to improve the original ones.  The European Commission reported 
widespread differences in interpretations of the Directives in different Member States, which 
it felt needed to be clarified and eliminated in order to ensure a respectful and fair level 
playing field (European Commission, COM (2010) 456,COM (2007) 745).  The evaluation of 
the original Procedures Directive in particular highlighted the differences in interpretation 
concerning accelerated procedures: ‘legal assistance and access to an effective remedy…[is 
potentially hindering full cooperation] to ensure full respect for the principle of non-
refoulement and other rights enshrined in the EU’ (European Commission, COM (2010) 456: 
15).  The UK was mentioned in these reports as a Member State that was, in its view, taking 
too wide an interpretation of the articles that allowed it to do so. 
For the UK, in one respect, the opt-out of the resulting recast (improved) Directives confirm 
the motives behind the wide interpretation taken by the Government of some of the articles 
highlighted by the European Commission in the original directives, in order to operate the 
                                                          
6 Procedures Directive (2005/85/EC) (PD), Reception Directive (2003/9/EC) (RD) 
7 recast Procedures Directive (2013/32/EU) (RCD), recast Reception Directive (2013/33/EU) (RCD) 
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DFT procedure.  Those articles relevant to this study of accelerated procedures include: 
improved judicial review access after 72 hours (article 9(2) RCD), limits on the use of 
accelerated procedures (article 31 RPD), more rights in relation to legal assistance (article 22 
RPD), and article 46 RPD governing the right of appeal (Buckley, 2011), including a time 
frame of ‘at least one week’ to gather evidence (article 46(7)(a)), as well as enhanced legal 
representation in general.  Indeed, the UK Government accepts that opting into the recast 
Procedures Directive will restrict their ability to operate the fast-track system (Green, 2011) 
and eliminate their ability to operate ‘with discretion’ (Hillier, 2010: 3) in relation to cases 
routed onto the DFT.  It follows, then, that UK government’s decision to opt out of these 
remedies may ‘diminish migrants’ and refugees’ rights’ (Costello and Hancox, 2014: 7).  It is 
partly due to this basis that it seems the UK is at odds with the minimum standards set by the 
EU. 
It is because of this discrepancy that the signing of the Treaty of Lisbon, recognising equal 
‘primary law or treaty law [status] to the EU Charter’ (Piris, 2010: 149) (and thus 
strengthening legislation) is important in order to urge the UK to use internationally agreed 
minimum standards when receiving asylum seekers.  The question remains whether the 
enhanced powers of the Charter could encourage standardisation within CEAS, which would 
result in the much improved UK operations regarding the DFT.  The articles of the Charter of 
interest in this case include the guaranteed right to asylum in article 18 of the Charter as well 
as article 52(1), which if applied to the DFT operations may enhance the protection for 
asylum seekers possibly tailored to the way in which they are treated whilst their claim is 
being processed.   
The rights in the Charter, like similar rules for the ECHR (regarding EU legislation), only 
apply in situations where EU law is being implemented (Peers et al, 2012), though until 
recently there has been little dialogue between the two treaties.  However, this has begun to 
change after Lisbon as was seen in MMS v Belgium and Greece (30696/09) where ‘EU law 
[was used] to enhance the concept of degrading treatment [article 3 ECHR rights]’ (Lambert, 
2012: 27) in Strasbourg, which leads to the suggestion that even if the UK has opted out of 
the recast Directives, ‘it will be bound through the higher standard developed by the ECtHR’ 
(Lambert, 2012: 336) as it continues to develop.  It therefore sets a precedent for the approach 
to article 3 cases and potentially beyond.   
However, although a potentially strong case for the future of European standardisation, it 
seems that at present it is not a realistic argument, with some reiterating that ‘neither the 
general principles of law nor the charter can extend in any way the competences of the union 
as defined in the treaties’ (Rhee, 2011: 1).  While it may be easier to present overall positions 
as contrary to the principles of EU law, it unsurprisingly seems more difficult to argue to 
implement smaller enhanced operational detail regarding the DFT; ultimately, Member States 
must retain their sovereignty.  Therefore, at present it is still to be seen if EU case law 
develops in a manner consistent enough to encourage the UK to adhere to higher minimum 
asylum standards, which would certainly limit the use of accelerated procedures in the UK. 
5 The DFT Process 
5.1 Screening 
The asylum process starts with a screening interview, which is a brief collection of the facts.  
A more in-depth substantive interview happens at a later date.  The screening process for the 
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purposes of the DFT has been subject to much criticism.  This is because the decision to 
detain the applicant on the DFT is taken before the substantive interview, and therefore 
before all the facts are known. 
Article 3 of the Convention Against Torture protects the notion of ‘non-refoulement’, 
restricting States to return an applicant to their home country where there is ‘substantial’ 
evidence of torture.  This is a recognised notion of customary international law.  Article 3(2) 
of the treaty explains that the receiving State should ‘take into account all relevant 
considerations’ when deciding whether returning an asylum seeker would be in breach of this 
recognised norm.  Article 12 of the Procedures Directive does allow for limited 
circumstances where the personal interview can be omitted (article 12(2/3)) and this does not 
prevent the authorities to make a final decision (article 12(4)), although it also explains that: 
‘before a decision is taken by the determining authority, the applicant for asylum shall be 
given the opportunity of a personal interview on his/her application for asylum with a person 
competent under national law to conduct such an interview’  (article 12(1)).  Article 18(1)PD 
permits: ‘Member States shall not hold a person in detention for the sole reason that he/she is 
an applicant for asylum’.  UK Home Office policy allows for the decision to fast track an 
application to be made before the substantive interview, subject to suitability criteria (Home 
Office 2013b).  The Fast Track procedure has a 99% initial refusal rate (Phelps, 2014: 3), 
compared to a 70% refusal rate for non-DFT applicants. 
Home Office policy agrees that more detail is required in the second interview.  The policy 
assumes all claims are suitable for the DFT; it therefore allows entry to the fast track due to 
lack of evidence weighing against a decision to admit an applicant (Home Office, 2012: 8).   
The policy ensures that the decision to detain borderline cases on the fast track is not made by 
the screening officer, but is made remotely by a senior caseworker at the National Asylum 
Intake Unit (NAIU) after an email or telephone referral by the screening officer (Home 
Office, 2013b: 3.1.1).  The decision to detain the applicant on the DFT would require a 
formal referral, which consists of a scanned copy of the screening interview transcript8.    
This hierarchical system implies that some officers are better equipped at making decisions 
than others.  In addition, the Home Office Guidelines also state that screening officers can 
decide to detain in all cases that are out of ‘NAIU during opening hours’ (Home Office, 
2013b: 3.1.1) without consultation.   
The quality of this decision-making has been criticised by experts.  Detention Action explain: 
‘the screening interview typically lasts a few minutes and usually takes place in a non-
confidential environment’ (Detention Action, 2011: 30), adding that it ‘is not appropriate to 
ask more in-depth questions before an asylum-seeker has had access to legal advice’ 
(Detention Action, 2013: 2).  The UNHCR have criticised the screening process as 
inadequate: ‘front-end screening and routing procedures are still not sufficient to adequately 
assess whether a case is complex or an applicant is vulnerable’ (UNHCR, 2010: 4).  In 
addition, the JCHR explains that the DFT carries a risk of arbitrary detention as the screening 
process encourages assumptions about the individual case before the facts are known (JCHR, 
2007: 74).   NGOs working to abolish the DFT agree, explaining the screening process as 
being a ‘mystery’ (BID, 2006: 15), (Detention Action, 2011: 28), (aida, 2014: 34).  The ILPS 
emphasise the low threshold of certainty when routing an applicant into the DFT: ‘the policy 
requires that a case can only ‘appear’ to be one that can be decided quickly after screening’ 
                                                          
8 Along with any other documents given in the interview, the presence of which are rare 
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(ILPA, 2008: 14), hence the briefness of the interview.  It seems the Government, though, 
does not agree, and has not yet changed the policy (Harvey, 2013: 104). 
The brief approach to the intake decision may make the initial procedure a potential breach of 
article 18(1)PD, wrongfully detaining applicants on the DFT who do not meet the criteria 
specified by UK policy, and are therefore arbitrarily holding them because they have claimed 
asylum.  Indeed, the decision-making at this stage is fairly inaccurate; between 16% and 22% 
of those accepted onto the fast track were wrongfully placed on it (see appendix 10), 
subsequently taken out of the fast track before an initial decision was made about their claim 
between 2008 and 20139.  
R (JB) Jamaica v SSHD, ([2013] EWCA Civ 666), raises these screening interview 
procedural flaws, providing a recent example, resulting in the interviewing officers not going 
into the essential detail of a claim in question.   Lord Justice Moore Blick concludes that the 
screening id not tailored to the DFT, resulting in a likely unfair and unsustainable decision 
(para. 28), claiming that in this case the Home Office did not comply with her own policy of 
asking supplementary questions.  This is a common complaint from those that experience the 
interview: ‘the screening process makes it impossible for there to be any meaningful 
decision-making on suitability’ (Cutler, 2007: 17).  
The conclusion of the Parliamentary Select Committee’s 7th report on asylum confirms these 
problems of the screening process, which suggests improvements such as more privacy, and 
better trained officers (Home Affairs Committee, 2013: Q 32).  It was also suggested that the 
figure wrongly allocated to the DFT was more like a third (Home Affairs Committee, 2013: 
29).  More recently in DA, however, Justice Ouseley disputed these figures, branding them 
misleading (para. 102), blaming the sample size used to arrive at that conclusion.  He 
upholds, however, the inadequacy of the screening process as something that the Home 
Office must improve (para. 105). 
Grave concerns linger, therefore, regarding the basic structure of the DFT and the likelihood 
of being wrongly routed onto the DFT; with a minimum of around a quarter of DFT 
applicants subsequently taken off the scheme, it is likely that this mistake is routinely 
occurring.  This breaches the Home Office’s policy (as was found in JB), and therefore 
threatens to routinely detain applicants arbitrarily to breach article 18(1)PD.  It is also clear 
that any decision to detain (and subsequent second interview with a 99% refusal rate) is 
referred to somebody more competent to make it; it seems it would be more in line with 
article 12(1)PD if the decision to detain and route onto the DFT was made by the expert 
officer to which the case is referred.  Ultimately, if an applicant is wrongly routed onto the 
DFT and is not detected, the subsequent 99% refusal rate puts the UK at great risk of 
breaching the principle of non-refoulement.  
5.2 DFT Detention Criteria 
The Home Office’s policy concerning what constitutes a quick decision (and subsequent 
entry onto the DFT) within UK Law therefore has an element which is based on assumption.  
                                                          
9 (although the actual figure is likely to be higher than this (Solicitor A, Solicitor B, August 
2014)), which is discussed in due course 
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The criteria given can be applied to a wide range of cases, opening the argument regarding 
what constitutes a quick decision. 
The Procedures Directive permits accelerated procedures at article 23(3), subject to the basic 
procedures of Chapter II (articles 6-22).  In article 8(2)(b), a decision must follow an 
‘appropriate examination’, and member states should ensure that: ‘precise and up-to-date 
information is obtained from various sources...as to the general situation prevailing in the 
countries of origin of applicants for asylum’ is used by decision makers.  It is also inherent in 
the policy that the applicant should not be disadvantaged on account of the speed of the 
process. 
Home Office Policy position detailing who to route through the DFT currently has ‘no 
requirements as to nationality or country of origin and no other bases of detention policy need 
apply’ (Home Office, 2013b: 2.1).  Home Office DFT suitability criteria are where it appears 
likely that: no further enquiries are needed to gather evidence, or where those enquiries can 
be completed within the DFT timescale; it will be possible to consider the claim within the 
set timescale; no translations will be required, or where these can be obtained within the 
timescale; the case is “clearly unfounded” under S. 94 of the Nationality, Immigration and 
Asylum Act 2002 (Home Office, 2013b: 2.2)10. 
For a claim to be a quick decision, the criteria focus only on speed and simplicity, although 
for the claim to be “clearly unfounded” is new dimension, ‘now explicitly a criterion for 
inclusion in the DFT’ (aida, 2014: 34).  In R(L) v SSHD ([2003] EWCA Civ 25), the term 
was interpreted as an objective decision, which ‘should not depend on the Home Secretary’s 
view, …[but] upon a criterion which a court can readily re-apply once it has the materials 
which the Home Secretary had’ (para. 56).  Given the 99% refusal rate after the substantive 
interview, it seems many are routed into the DFT on the basis of a clearly unfounded claim.  
However, given the definition above, it seems unfair to make this decision without knowing 
the facts full circumstances or seeing the evidence in its entirety. 
Published country information was available to aid officers in understanding which 
nationalities were suitable for the DFT in Saadi.  This list was withdrawn in 2008 (Detention 
Action 2014: 6).  However, there continues to be an unexplainable rise in certain nationalities 
being put onto the fast track in disproportionate numbers (see appendix 12 for graph).  If 
nationality was no longer a factor these statistics would not show such a steep increase.  For 
example, there was a 93% increase in applicants of Pakistani origin accepted onto the DFT in 
the year 2013 compared to 2012.  This increasing pattern can be seen in other nationalities as 
well (see appendix 13).  As can be seen from Appendix 13, this increase is not reflected in the 
overall asylum applications received over the same period.   
Out of this list of countries, only one is listed under s 94 of the 2002 Act (Nigeria).  It is 
concerning that the percentage increases are so high, while a similar pattern is not seen in the 
overall figures for asylum applications.  It is feared that ‘an informal presumption is in 
operation which associates those countries of origin with unmeritorious claims, but without 
even the rudimentary safeguard of a list which can be challenged’ (aida, 2014: 34).  What’s 
more, if this is the case, then the test identified in R(L) is almost certainly not being applied 
                                                          
10 See appendix 11 for limitations to clearly unfounded claims, including a country list 
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correctly.  Indeed, Harvey describes screening ‘like little more than a feeder for the detained 
fast-track’ (2013: 104). 
The Home Office hold that fast track decision makers have an “operational tool” named the 
RAG (Red Amber Green) list, which is not published as it is fluid.  The list, as detailed in DA 
(para. 63-65), permits officials to admit applicants from “Green” countries onto the DFT 
without further consultation.  This very system gives another possible insight on the 
disproportionate nationality increase in DFT entrants, and suggests that the thought given to 
whether a claim can be decided quickly is secondary at times to the nationality which 
presents at screening.   Not publishing the list or “operational tool” means that it is not 
subject to public scrutiny.   
Many in the field are of the opinion that the concept of a quick decision does not work and is 
unnecessary.  Solicitor A doubts if any claim could be classed as simple, pointing out that a 
quick decision does not really exist (unless you are not believed): ‘no one’s stories are easy’ 
(Aug 2014).  Harvey notes: ‘designation is ultimately an attempt to find a short cut and short 
cut ways always run the risk that one is not determining each claim on its merits’ (Harvey, 
2012: 9).  Solicitor A adds: ‘it strikes me that people that they just choose to be put on the 
system, they can’t all be false...it doesn’t make any statistical sense’ (August 2014).  Indeed 
this view is gathering speed: ‘the speed of the procedure may also undermine the carefulness 
of the procedure’ (Reneman, 2014: 718), and this speedy process must only be in the interests 
of applicant ‘if it doesn’t come at the cost of fairness’ (Rooney, 2004: online).  With a view to 
making the system fair, the precarious link shown by the data between a quick decision and 
nationality must be expanded on by the Home Office; currently it is unexplained in published 
policy. 
In Suckrajh v AIT & SSHD (2011), the applicant’s admission to the DFT was addressed, as it 
seemed that his admission to the DFT was both because his claim could be decided quickly, 
but also because it was decided that he was a risk to the public.  It raises the question whether 
the DFT is being used for other purposes, due to the seemingly relaxed nature/low threshold 
of the decision-making.  The UNHCR, intervening in the case, put forward that ‘a review of 
the operation of the DFT procedures showed that significant and repeated errors were made’ 
(para 29).  However, Lord Justice Thomas upheld the decision to detain on the DFT in this 
case as lawful, explaining his case could be decided quickly (para. 53). 
Although not accepted by the Home Office, a more accurate interpretation of a “quick 
decision” is one which has no merits, and can therefore be decided quickly.  In addition, it 
may also be plausible that the lower threshold in accepting DFT entrants gives rise to a 
culture of normalisation, with the idea that detention for a quick decision is the easiest and 
most convenient solution for the Home Office, while it can exercise its non-exhaustive 
criteria with ‘discretion’ (Hillier, 2010: 3).  If so, these applicants would be increasingly 
detained unnecessarily. 
Furthermore, it is clear that the apparent policy to disproportionately detain higher numbers 
of certain nationalities on the DFT is in direct contrast to the Home Office official position 
that a “quick decision” is not concerned with nationality.  In addition, the unpublished RAG 
list, along with confirmation that officers can detain those from “green” countries without 
expert referrals, does seem to be contrary to the intended meaning and purpose of article 
8(2)PD, as the directive itself is designed to protect against wrongful use of detention.  In any 
case, with a general assumption among critics that the power to detain on the DFT is very 
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often a claim which is assumed to be unfounded, there is confirmation that the DFT has 
evolved into something different to the system upheld in Saadi. 
6 Quality of Decision Making 
6.1 Access to Legal Aid  
Once admitted onto the DFT, access to a lawyer is always granted, though usually without 
sufficient time to prepare the claim fully before the substantive interview. 
Articles 15 and 16 of the Procedures Directive are concerned with legal representation.  
Article 15(1) provides that the member state should ‘allow applicants for asylum the 
opportunity, at their own cost, to consult in an effective manner a legal adviser’, allowing the 
Member State to write their policy into national law with some limitations (Article 15(3)).  
Those accepted onto the DFT are automatically given a legal aid lawyer if they qualify for 
one, and have not already got one.   
The Home Office consider that the high refusal rate for asylum claims on the DFT that ‘this 
proof that their selection of cases for fast track is impeccable’ (Yeo, 2013: online). However, 
one major issue is the amount of time allocated for the solicitor to prepare the case before the 
substantive interview, in many cases limiting the amount of evidence that can be prepared.  
The published timeline (see Appendix 9) for the DFT timetables stipulates that the solicitor is 
given access to the client on the same day as the interview, and often with less than an hour to 
spare.  Solicitor B explains: ‘it’s really just enough time to introduce yourself…You would 
be hearing the details of their claim for the first time during the interview’ (Solicitor B, Aug 
2014).  The 2014 DA judgement identified this shortcoming as being one of the most crucial 
problems within the DFT.  However, the court refused to suspend the DFT on these grounds 
despite the findings, which is currently in the court of appeal at the time of writing.   
Given the small amount of time given before the interview, some critics believe that this 
renders the process unfair, as there is no time to gather the evidence needed.  Critics of the 
DFT therefore put emphasis on ‘frontloading’; a term that describes how ‘resources are 
implemented at the beginning of the asylum process in order to ensure high quality initial 
decision-making’ (Westaby, 2014: online).  This is a recognised technique, which has been 
proven to improve the quality of the initial decision where there is evidence to gather11.  
Although some are in disagreement over how frontloading should be carried out (Barrister A, 
August 2014), there is evidence that a similar approach leads to better safeguarding for 
vulnerable applicants on the DFT.  Giving evidence in DA, Ms Mckinney explains that ‘The 
process works better at Yarl’s Wood than at Harmondsworth because they have longer notice 
of interviews’ (para. 173).  Indeed, this is reflected in the figures; double the amount of those 
detained on the DFT in Yarl’s Wood are released before the initial decision, compared to 
DFT applicants in Harmondsworth (See appendix 10).  This adds weight to the suggestion 
that frontloading aids safeguarding, and an unfair amount of time is given with lawyers. 
                                                          
11 The Project, commissioned by the Home Office in 2009, concluded that there was no substantial impact on 
asylum decisions compared to the usual system, reporting that it increases the number of refusals and the cost 
per case.  However, it evaluated that the system reduces the number of refusals, that here was an increase in 
granting Discretionary Leave, and the project reported improved decision-making for complex cases ‘early 
provision of evidence and witness statements’ (Home Office Science, May 2013) 
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As a remedy, Justice Ouseley stated that 4 clear working days with a lawyer before the 
substantive interview would increase the chances of the process being fair ([2014] EWHC 
2525 (Admin)).  Although this would be a big improvement on what has previously been a 
completely unworkable situation until now (Solicitor B, Aug 2014), some feel that this still 
not sufficien (Solicitor A, Aug 2014).   
It does seem, therefore, that an asylum seeker routed onto the DFT is routinely denied their 
right to consult a solicitor in an ‘effective manner’, written into article 15(1)PD.   
There are also suggestions that the way the duty solicitor rota is organised by the Home 
Office results in the legal aid offered to those on the DFT being less competitive, leading to 
ineffectiveness. 
Home Office policy runs a duty solicitor scheme (informally entitled ‘The Legal Surgeries’) 
which it deal with any representation issues or legal advice.  This agreement has in recent 
years been governed by an exclusivity contract which details that detainees in detention and 
more specifically on the DFT are only entitled to legal representation from only certain firms.  
This is set out in section 8.46 of the Standard Civil Criteria, and specifies a fixed fee.   
This type of in-house immigration advice was put in place to ‘[improve] a detained 
individual’s access to prompt quality legal advice’ (IAC, 2008: 18). However, express 
concern due to inconsistency: ‘some of the firms are good, whilst others are dreadful’ 
(Medical Justice, 2013), (HM Chief Inspectorate of Prisons, 2013: 31)12.  Further, it only 
allows 30 minutes of free legal advice, and on a second visit to the scheme there is no 
guarantee that the same solicitor will be given again.  In addition, many fear that the 
exclusivity of the system (and the fixed fee culture) creates a lack of competiveness, as well 
as overstretches these firms in terms of resources: ‘the contracts were offered to a very small 
number of firms which means there is a lack of competition for the provision of these 
services and this impacts on the quality of the representation’ (Solicitor B, Aug 2014).  
Solicitor A reveals that the negative outcome of this allocation is that detainees become 
abandoned, waiting for their representative to have time to push their case forward: ‘You end 
up having other detainees doing the representation for them,…filling in bail applications etc’ 
(Aug 2014).  
Indeed, this view was confirmed in a recent unannounced inspection of Harmondsworth IRC, 
referring to a peer mentoring role as a “buddy scheme”: ‘the number of advice surgeries had 
increased but too many detainees did not have a lawyer. Unaccredited and untrained buddies 
attempted to compensate for unmet need by assisting with form filling’ (HM Chief Inspector 
of Prisons, 2013: 31).  This insight demonstrates the inadequacy of access to legal advice, 
resulting in relying on untrained fellow detainees to help progress their case forward.  The 
legal Surgeries currently run 4 days a week in Harmondsworth, and 3 a week in Yarl’s Wood, 
which also created delays.  In a recent survey led by BID, 60% of their sample waited one 
week for an appointment with a solicitor, 26% waited for 2 weeks or 2 weeks to date, 17% 
waited 3 weeks or longer in July 201413 (BIDUK, 2014).   
Despite this discussion implicating the ineffective nature of lawyer consultation for those on 
the DFT (and therefore again undermining article 15(1)PD), this also has impacts on the 
                                                          
12 Staff of Harmondsworth IRC informed the inspectorate that ‘some firms had a better reputation than others’ 
13 A total of 125 detainees were interviewed between 19th May and 13th June 2014.   
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effectiveness of the DFT.  Given that administrative detention was upheld as lawful against 
ECHR article 5(1)(f) in Saadi on the basis of speed, this clearly has implications on the DFT 
as it is currently run (in particular relation to the appeals process once the substantive interview 
has been conducted).  The 2014 DA judgement recognises this, but did not consider that this 
aspect of the DFT could be rendered unlawful on the basis of lack of evidence (para 85).  
However, Barrister A explains that this inefficiency alludes to unlawful detention, but that ‘the 
judge avoided that issue’ throughout the judgment, ruling only on the unfairness (leading to 
unlawfulness) aspect of Detention Action’s complaints. She added, though, that although 
inexcusable, the inefficiency would be unlikely to be ruled unlawful due to its case specific 
nature (September 2014).   
Nevertheless, the oversubscribed nature of the duty solicitor scheme is sufficient to 
demonstrate that ‘legal visits arrangements were inefficient and disorganised’ (HM Chief 
Inspector of Prisons, 2011: 13).  The effects of this extend to applicants being held for a period 
which is longer than necessary, contrary to the purpose of the DFT, which is speed.  Although 
it is true that this problem cannot be given a specific remedy in general policy, in the absence 
of a time limit put of detention stays, efforts should be taken to ensure the applicant’s detention 
is necessary and proportionate at all times. 
7 Fast Track Appeals Process 
The inclusion of appeals to the DFT procedure controversially lengthened the average time in 
detention for the scheme.  What’s more, critics believe that the time given to prepare for the 
appeals is insufficient for a fair trial. 
The Immigration and Asylum Appeals (Fast Track Procedure) 2003 No. 801 (L. 21) puts a 
time limit of 2 days to appeal a decision, written into Rule 8(1) of the legislation.  Rule 8(2) 
does allow for occasional out of time decisions, though only if it was considered ‘not 
practicable’ to submit the appeal within the time limit.  This legislation applied initially to 
those residing in Harmondsworth IRC.  It then extended to Yarl’s Wood, Colnbrook and 
Campsfield.  The current governing legislation is The Immigration and Asylum Appeals (Fast 
Track Procedure) 2005 No. 560 (L.12).  Rule 8 remains the same throughout the amended 
legislation.  In addition, Article 39PD, provides the right to an effective remedy before a 
court tribunal (article 39(1)), with the freedom to lay down time limits connected to this right 
in national law (article 39(2) and (4)).  Article 6 ECHR and article 14 ICCPR both define 
rights connected to a fair trial.  In addition, article 6 of the Lisbon treaty allows article 47 of 
the charter to become binding on the UK; the right to an effective remedy and fair trial.  
In the year 2013, 92% of fast-track appeals were upheld, not changing significantly from 
recent previous years (Home Office Statistics, Q2 2014: table as_12).  Critics use this figure 
to prove that the DFT appeals system is inadequate.  The Home Office, however, use this 
figure as a measure to show that the DFT is working well; the refusal rate in their opinion 
‘showing cases suitable for fast determination were being selected with a higher proportion 
lacking merit than outside the DFT’ (DA, para 181).   
However, the 2 day time limit to register the appeal from the refusal date means that there is 
often not enough preparation for the case because gathering evidence in order to support the 
grounds on which the detainee will appeal is difficult (Oakley, 2007: 17).    As a result, 
weaker cases are put forward.  This affects the outcome of the appeal, compromising the 
fairness of the trial. 
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In addition, the LSC-run duty solicitors are contracted to work on a merits basis; only if a 
case is likely to win (60% chance and above), or if a case is borderline (between 50% and 
60% chance of success) will the solicitor be able to take on the case.  Many LSC contracted 
solicitors strictly adhere to this policy, not just because the firms’ resources are overstretched, 
but because ‘representing a case that does not merit public funds can result in severe penalties 
for legal representatives and their firms. Under new rules soon to come into force, they could 
lose their contract to do asylum work if they do not win at least 40% of the asylum appeals 
they grant public funding to’ (Oakley, 2007: 18).  This is problematic because gaining 
evidence to prove the claim will not be solved (given the 2 day time-limit), and therefore may 
influence the merits test judgement. This undoubtedly contributes towards a large proportion 
of fast-track detainees unrepresented for appeal.  In 2010 63% of those at appeals were 
unrepresented (Detention Action, 2011: 30), 59% were unrepresented in 2013 (Detention 
Action, 2013: 3).  Not surprisingly, this impacts on the appeal outcomes as a whole.  ‘Only 
1% of them won their appeals, compared to 20% of those with a representative’ in January to 
September 2012 (Detention Action, 2014: 7)14.  The Home Office has representation at every 
hearing.  This set up suggests that the system is not well-suited to creating consistent 
conditions which ensure a fair trial. 
Whether this is a breach of the relevant legislation is unclear.  As stated, freedom written into 
the Procedures directive for Member States to create their own rules with regard to time 
limits and legal aid remain a national decision.  It is also worth noting ‘“inherent procedural 
safeguards”…cannot be found directly on article 6 itself’ (Mole, 2000: 25)15, a degree of 
fairness can be derived from article 6 when defining the implementation of the appeals 
process.  
Indeed, the ECtHR has already judged acknowledged the difficulty with accelerated time 
limits for asylum decision appeals.  ‘The courts have decided that where the State establishes 
the right to appeal, it must ensure that people can enjoy the fundamental guarantees of that 
right and that, in the way that it regulates the right, it does not restrict it so that “the very 
essence of the right is impaired”’16 (JCHR, 2007: 21).  Therefore, although time limits to 
appeal are accepted as necessary by the Court of Justice, these time scales should not hinder 
the right to a fair trial so much that it makes it impossible for the applicant.  This was 
referring to the principle of effectiveness considered in Rewe (120/78, para. 19) where the 
Court ruled that although Member States should uphold autonomy in their decisions, this 
principle restricts procedural rules so that they do not become “practically impossible” or 
“excessively difficult”17.  Article 14 of the ICCPR emphasises this in upholding the right to a 
fair hearing, which is an absolute right ‘very much comparable to those offered by Article 6 
ECHR’ (Reneman, 2008).  It is therefore suggested that interpretations of the relevant articles 
                                                          
14 This figure is not much different from data during January to September 2010: ‘14% of appeals 
were allowed where the asylum-seeker was represented, as opposed to 2% where they were 
unrepresented’ (Detention Action, 2011: 29) 
15 Article 6ECHR does not govern the decision to remove an applicant for asylum (Maaouia v France 
(2001) 33 EHRR 42) 
16 Saleem v SSHD ([2001] 1 WLR 443), para. 458.  
17 This conclusion was drawn in other cases; Bahaddar v The Netherlands noted the 
difficulty/impossibility of supplying evidence in a short time (para. 45); in Jabari v Turkey the 
automatic 5 day time limit ‘must be considered at variance with the protection of the fundamental 
value embodied in Article 3 ECHR’ (para. 40) (2000); in I.M. v France (2012) Strasbourg warns of 
the severe difficulty in gathering evidence within a 5 day time limit 
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39(2) and (4) are ‘limited by the EU right to an effective remedy and the principle of 
effectiveness’ (Reneman, 2014: 725). 
From this platform, it is useful to explore the principles that arise from international and 
relevant EU legislation that may inform best practice within the area of an effective remedy 
in relation to asylum matters, and any further implications on the DFT. With the entering into 
force of the Lisbon Treaty and with is the strengthening of the EU Charter as binding, the 
weight of article 47 adds to this principle a right to an effective remedy, applying the rights 
laid out in article 6 ECHR to a fair trial, but taking away the requirement that the case must 
be one of civil rights or criminal charges, therefore applying to all trials, including asylum 
cases.  It is therefore recognised for some EU Charter articles, including article 47 that: ‘the 
meaning is the same as the corresponding Articles of the ECHR, but where the scope is 
wider’ (OJEU, 2007: 19). This is suggested to encroach on the UK’s freedom to make 
decisions entirely autonomously, with many arguing that the EU case law concerning the 
right to a fair trial ‘explicitly includes the right to legal aid…whenever it is necessary to 
ensure the effective enforcement of rights derived from the EU legal order’ (Peers et al., 
2012: 46).  Indeed, given the power handed to the Court of Justice to interpret the application 
of treaties in article 19(1) of the Lisbon Treaty, these aspects are developing.  This further 
observation would impact on the number of detainees unrepresented at appeals. 
The case law demonstrates an emerging picture limiting the use of autonomous national 
decisions if they are jeopardising the Right to an effective remedy and the principle of 
effectiveness.  In the case law, limits ranging from 4 months to 5 days are considered to be 
potentially in breach of these principles.  As stated, the UK has given a 2 day time limit to 
appeal, laid down in national law despite calls from many institutions and practitioners that it 
is not workable and unfair.  In my view, it is incompatible with the UK’s European 
obligations where the rules do not render a procedure which is practically impossible to 
succeed in.   
This extends to the way in which the LSC contracts have been made exclusive to the removal 
centres in question, stretching the resources and creating a culture of non-competitiveness, as 
well as the sanctions imposed on those contracting lawyers in applying the merits test 
incorrectly, resulting in those unrepresented at appeal outweighing those who are. 
7.1 Fast Track Criteria: Appeals 
Importantly, however, it is unclear in the first place why applicants are still detained under 
fast track criteria when appealing, and not general detention criteria (briefly: abscond risks or 
with a view to removal).  
Considering the procedure at Oakington did not include the appeals process, it is unclear in 
UK policy at what stage this became part of the fast track procedure.  In DA, the judge 
explained that there was a change, and it became policy to detain applicants under fast track 
criteria until they were appeal-rights exhausted.  However, ‘there is no evidence of this 
change’ (Barrister A, August 2014).  Further, the Secretary of State in 2008 alleged that it 
was the policy all the way through to detain on fast track criteria, contrary to the judge’s 
position (para. 59).  Indeed, the policy change is confused and the explanation for it has never 
been properly explained, with the judge also not explaining the justification for applicants to 
remain under fast track criteria, only concluding that the justification would be the same as 
the pre-decision fast track justification;: to aid a speedy outcome (para. 59).   
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As Barrister A explains Saadi detention was allowed on the basis of speed, in relation to the 
administration efficiencies such as timetabling, ‘but for an appeal, none of that applies.  The 
only thing that person has to turn up for is the appeal hearing.  And if they don’t turn up for 
the appeal hearing, then it can be… it can go ahead without them’ (August 2014).  It is not 
necessary to be on site in order to detain carry out the appeal.  
This issue is currently in the Court of Appeal awaiting judgment.  The important underlying 
issue is general detention criteria of those that are abscond risks and to effect removal, though 
fast track criteria has a lower threshold, allowing those to be detained who are not abscond 
risks.  It therefore seems likely that this part of the DFT is detaining those unlawfully, as they 
may otherwise not meet the normal general criteria for detention.  If this is true, this would 
breach rights laid out in article 5(1)(f) ECHR, and amount to unlawful detention. 
8 Flexibility 
The ability for the DFT process to be flexible impacts greatly on whether is operating 
lawfully.  Many feel the safeguards to screen and detect vulnerable clients are not strong 
enough. 
As a result of the RLC v SSHD case brought in 2004, the Home Office were obliged to put a 
flexibility policy into writing (Home Office, Sept 2012).  This sets out procedures which 
must be taken to ensure vulnerable applicants are not detained.  The reason for this flexibility 
is to identify those who are vulnerable and unfit for detention.  The Home Office DFT policy 
(Home Office, June 2013b) lists those exempt from the DFT, including, among others, 
mentally ill applicants, trafficked applicants and torture victims.  Under Home Office policy, 
safeguarding procedures are laid out: Rule 34 which says that detainees are entitled to a 
medical examination within 24 hours of being in detention, and Rule 35 which is a report 
conducted in the detention centre documenting evidence of torture.  Articles 20 and 17 of the 
Receptions Directive protect the right to adequate treatment for vulnerable applicants.  
Article 3 of the ECHR which prevents ‘inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment’ is 
also relevant. 
Procedures to screen torture, trafficking and mentally ill patients at screening are, as seen 
earlier, conducted in a relaxed manner.  The screening questions are brief, and the acceptance 
criteria low.  In contrast, the exclusion criteria require a high degree of certainty with regards 
to the credibility of each claim.  For example, those excluded on the grounds of mental health 
must ‘clearly lack the mental capacity or coherence to sufficiently understand the asylum 
process’ (Home Office, 2013b: 2.3). It explains that this decision should be made on medical 
evidence (although does not specify which medical conditions should be accepted), though it 
permits the screening officer to ‘apply their judgement as to an individual’s apparent 
capacity’.   
On arrival to the centre, Rule 34 (applied by staff untrained in psychiatric care (Medical 
Justice, 2013: 4)) assists little; the criteria evaluating mental illness in terms of fitness for 
detention is still general: ‘suffering from a serious mental illness that cannot be satisfactorily 
managed in detention’ (Home Office, 2014: 55.10).  The terms “serious” and “that 
cannot…in detention” were added after 2010, prompting a challenge by ILPA.  In reply, the 
UKBA stated that the inclusion of “satisfactorily managed” is not defined, but rather a 
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measure to reflect the broad range of conditions (Cooke, 2013: 53)18.  Most recently, in the 
case of Das v SSHD ([2013] EWHC 682), an appeal overturned a High Court Judgment that 
“serious” amounted to the condition needing hospitalisation, on the basis that this protection 
policy was inappropriate, as well as recognising that “satisfactory management” should not 
mean that the treatment offered in detention prevented only that the detainee could not cope 
with life, rather a lower threshold should be given to the interpretation to prevent only those 
needing hospitalisation falling under the exclusion criteria.  The situation is concerning 
considering experts have warned that detention almost certainly increases the likelihood of 
mental illness: ‘this has produced evidence that the findings relate in part to pre-detention 
trauma experiences, in addition to detention itself having an independent adverse effect on 
mental health’ (Robjant et al., 2009: 310).  
Indeed, this broad policy must lead to errors in applying the policy on a regular basis.  In 
2011 the court (for the first time) recognised a breach of article 3 ECHR for failing to 
recognise a serious mental illness in the case of S v SSHD ([2011] EWHC 2120), and then for 
a second time in BA v SSHD ([2011] EWHC 2748) due to ‘a deplorable failure, from the 
outset, by those responsible for BA's detention to recognise the nature and extent of BA's 
illness’ (para. 236).  This finding is on the rise, with 5 cases in the last 2 years identifying a 
conditions akin to article 3 breaches (Medical Justice, 2014), with one more similar case 
settled out of court.  At the detention inquiry in July, a key expert witness explained: ‘One of 
the six cases in many ways is the most important because there wasn’t an underlying mental 
illness, the whole of the mental illness which became so severe that the person’s article 3 
rights were breached, all of that was caused, not just aggravated, caused by the detention’ 
(Oral evidence, [Katona] 2014).  This is in line with Solicitor A’s warning of article 3 claims 
in relation to detention are on the rise (August 2014).   
Similar issues are apparent when studying the Home Office flexibility to filter out torture and 
trafficking survivors.  Torture survivors linked to the advocate group Survivors Speak Out 
reveal ‘the difficulty of disclosing torture, lack of effort from officials to find out what had 
happened to us’ (Home Affairs Committee, 2013: 116).  The Rule 35 safeguard to identify 
those that have been tortured has been repeatedly found to be failing.  Indeed, there is 
evidence this is happening systematically throughout the DFT operations, with a recent 
unannounced inspection of Harmondsworth finding: ‘Despite some releases in 2013, the Rule 
35 process failed to provide an adequate safeguard for many vulnerable detainees’ (HMP 
Chief Inspectorate, 2013a: 14).  Indeed, a test case representing those wrongly detained in 
this way has recently found that in all 5 cases tested, each was found to breach article 3 rights 
(EO v SSHD [2010] EWHC 3000).  Jamie Beagent, of the law firm Leigh Day, noted that in 
each of the cases the Home Office had failed to follow its own rules, missing obvious signs 
such as scarring, not conducting the examination properly, or not affecting correct follow-up 
from the case worker due to the common position that the Home Office did not believe the 
applicant (Travis, 2013). 
The Home Office guidelines (Home Office, 2013a: 3) acknowledge that Rule 35 
examinations should be carried out with care, as those carrying out the examinations are not 
expertly trained, as is required in the Istanbul Protocol (a set of international guidelines 
detailing working with torture survivors), as IRC workers ‘are not expected…to be trained to 
the [Istanbul Protocol]’ (Home Office, 2013a: 2).  The guidelines go on to state that the 
                                                          
18 This change was ruled to the policy was ruled unlawful in HA v SSHD in 2012 against Race and equality laws 
as they were introduced without consultation (para 208 (3)) 
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examination is not a (more highly regarded) medico-legal report, and only constitutes 
independent evidence (and therefore qualifies for exclusion on the scheme) if ‘numerous 
scars’ are present and compatible with the applicant’s account of torture (Home Office, 
2013a: 3).  As a result, it seems Rule 35 reports are not fit for purpose and do not offer an 
adequate safeguard, indeed in evidence in DA, Ms Mckinney explained that none of her 
clients in her 8 year career have been released from the DFT on the basis of Rule 35 evidence 
(para. 173). 
The flexibility policy written up by the Home office as a result of RLC identifies that if a 
request for more time in order to collect sufficient evidence to take a client out of the DFT is 
granted, the substantive interview should be rescheduled for ‘later that day or ‘no more than 
one working day’ (Home Office, 2012: 6).  In reality, due to the timetable pressures, requests 
are made at the end of the interview, which are ‘generally refused’19, due to what the Home 
Office describe as ‘unsupported claims’ (DA, para. 173-7).  Although this position has 
obvious arguments against it; Solicitor B noted that exercising flexibility was in order to 
gather evidence, as well as referring to the coordination of DFT staff with regard to their 
flexible approach in this as ‘very poor’ (August 2014). 
As well as the negative court decisions, there has been national and international criticism of 
the Home Office position and execution of its policy.  UNCAT in its last review of the UK 
described the lack of guidance and inadequate screening process disadvantaged torture 
victims and those suffering mental health conditions referring particularly to the ‘the fact that 
torture survivors need to produce ‘independent evidence of torture’ (UNCAT, 2013: 11) as 
bad practice.   
Indeed, the reality gives rise to what some criticise as a culture of disbelief, with many 
believing that once the screening process has wrongly assessed a vulnerable applicant, the 
chances for the applicant to receive a positive decision are slim: ‘hasty decisions made at 
screening may in practice be irrevocable, whatever the jargon about ‘vulnerability filters 
operating throughout the process’’ (Harvey, 2013: 104), suddenly the applicant’s story is 
doubted (Harvey, 2012: 10).  The Home Office itself believe that in general the proof in a 
default negative decision would be a higher refusal rate, when commenting on the asylum 
statistics as a whole:  
‘we suggest that if there was a culture of disbelief, meaning refusal is the 
default mode, there would be a lower initial grant rate and more decisions 
would be overturned at appeal. As noted above, we grant asylum in 30% of 
cases and of those we refuse and which are appealed, we are currently 
winning 70%’ (Home Office, December 2013c: 5). 
This seemingly proves that the safeguarding system is failing dramatically. 
The judge DA largely acknowledged these deficiencies, though indicated that a longer time 
with the solicitor would eliminate the safeguarding failure risk.  In my opinion, although the 
shortcomings cannot be disaggregated (Barrister A, September 2014) this position still falls 
below the law; with the now regular finding that applicants are held in situations amounting 
to breaches of article 3, and the finding in Das that the policy on mental health has been 
unlawful shows the element of the DFT which is routinely contrary to article 3 of the ECHR, 
                                                          
19 Ms Mckinney had only had one 24 hour extension granted in her 8 year career. 
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and articles 17 and 20 of the Procedures Directive, is being routinely applied in the case of 
applicants routed onto the scheme. 
 
9 Conditions of Detention 
The conditions of detention for those on the DFT have become higher security than when the 
scheme was first started. 
Article 14(8)RD permits Member States to provide the guidelines for the conditions of 
detention, so long as the period holding the applicant is ‘as short as possible’, with the only 
requirement that the conditions set must meet ‘basic needs’. 
Although their liberty is restricted, applicants on the DFT are given more benefits than an 
applicant in prison, for example.  The detainees have a mobile phone, access to fax and 
internet.  The conditions are similar to a category B/C prison.  Concerns have been raised 
about these conditions, declaring them unfit for holding people for administrative purposes 
(Shah, 2008: 291). The conditions were found in DA not to be affecting the fairness of the 
process (para 209).   
However, the principle of the DFT, as it was tested in Saadi, was lawful under article 5(1) of 
the ECHR only if the four principles were satisfied.  One of these principles being that the 
conditions the applicant remained in were appropriate, bearing in mind the trauma they may 
have faced in the past (para. 74).  Indeed, mental health experts have long warned that there 
are many similarities between the current living conditions in detention for DFT applicants 
and the conditions they were likely held in if they were subject to ill-treatment in their own 
country, for example: ‘bars and uniform, keys jangling, screams of other prisoners, being in a 
cell’ (Oral evidence [Robjant], July 2014). 
However, although the conditions are now far from what was established in Saadi to be 
acceptable, this still does not mean that the DFT procedure itself is then unlawful; Barrister A 
referred to the unacceptable conditions detainees are held in in France or Greece, where the 
standards are much lower compared to a UK-run IRC (September 2014). 
Ultimately, the notion that stricter conditions are apparent in modern-day DFT criteria, does 
not seem to breach article 14(8)RD requirements to meet basic needs of the applicant, and 
would be unlikely to be a breach of article 5(1)ECHR, save in the event that there were not 
effective safeguards to prevent vulnerable applicants from being routed onto the DFT. 
10 Detention after the Detained Fast Track 
It is common for DFT applicants, after they have been refused asylum and have become 
appeal rights exhausted, to be continually held in detention under general criteria with a view 
to removal, or due to a risk of absconding. 
The UK opted out of the Returns Directive (2008/115/EC) which provides for stricter rules 
on detention for removal; article 15(1) states efforts for removal must be in progress, and 
article 15(5) says the period allowed for detention for this purpose cannot exceed 6 months.  
This legislation therefore does not apply to the UK.  For the UK, general detention criteria 
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apply, broadly set out in The Immigration and Asylum Act 1971.  The Home Office 
Guidelines, however, are more specific, and detention on general grounds for those appeals 
exhausted on the DFT scheme is likely to be: due to an absconding risk, or to effect removal 
(Home Office, 2014: 55.1.1).  The guidelines also note at 55.1.4.1 that the detention should 
be in accordance with article 5ECHR, and the time period should be ‘reasonable’, though no 
upper time limit is given.  In addition, article 14(8) of the Reception Directive notes the 
period should be as short as possible. 
To consider what constitutes a reasonable time in detention to effect removal, is often to 
consider individual cases.  However, the UK has been widely criticised for being almost 
unique in not adding an upper time limit to its detention legislation.  Although the necessity 
for a compulsory upper time limit is now arguably becoming a possible requirement under 
article 5(1)(f)20, with the ECHR beginning to recognise ‘the importance of setting a 
maximum duration for detention in domestic law’ (Lambert, 2012: 325). 
What is clear is that the system in place at the moment is not cost effective and is in certain 
cases not necessary (Solicitor A, 2014), (Johnston, 2009).   An FOI request made in the early 
stages of this project revealed that detention costs are on average £102 per detainee, per 
night.  In contrast, section 4 costs per night are likely to be lower, though a second FOI 
request to confirm this was rejected by the Home Office21 (see Appendix 15 and 16). 
However, it is true that all academics and policy makers believe that detention should be for 
the shortest period of time, even if a maximum time limit has not yet been set by the UK. But 
it should be remembered that the decision to detain after the DFT must be for a reason stated 
in the national guidelines.  Taking the example of detaining for the purpose of being 
removed, Home Office Statistics reveal that only about half the detainees are actually 
removed, whereas the other half are released on Temporary Admission or bailed (See 
Appendix 17).  What’s more, after 12 months of detention, the number of those removed 
compared to those released into section 4 accommodation are between a third and a quarter, 
with 2 thirds or more being released on bail (See Appendix 18), their detention serving very 
little purpose, if any at all.  Therefore, the more they are detained, the less efficient detention 
becomes, and the less likely it is that they will be removed successfully.  This conclusion was 
also drawn in a research study arguing for a time limit to be introduced (Detention Action, 
2010).   
Put in the context of the DFT specific statistics, much still seems the same: between 50% and 
71% of DFT applicants were removed at the end of the process between 2008 and 201222, 
despite the 99% refusal rate initially, and 93% of those appeals being “upheld”.  It follows 
that the removal-bail/Temporary Admission ratio is very similar to the trend in general 
detention, further undermining the method of detaining for a quick decision, suggesting that a 
large proportion of applicants on the DFT do not have simple cases, possibly proving that the 
DFT is being misused, possibly leading to unlawful detention cases.  It can also be argued 
from the data that officials are routinely detaining applicants without exercising due diligence 
to arrange removal.  If this is the case, the detention system is potentially breaching article 
                                                          
20 In Mathloom v Greece it was recognised that a lack of a maximum time limit pending deportation set in 
national law was a requirement of article 5(1)(f) 
21 In reply, the Home Office explained that revealing this information would not be in the public interest to 
disclose the information as it needs to protect its commercial competitiveness (see appendix) 
22 This evidence was divulged in Home Office evidence in DA, para. 73 
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5(1)(f) of the ECHR and article 14(8) of the reception directive on a more regular basis than 
is officially accepted, with regards to the DFT. 
 
 
11 Conclusion 
The research has highlighted that the UK Government should in part change the way in 
which Home Office policies are executed.  With such a delicate balance between speed, 
fairness and unlawful detention, such basic failings in every part of the system should not be 
tolerated, and must be handled with more care, or abolished altogether.  The DFT has evolved 
beyond recognition since Saadi’s controversial partly dissented decision that the principle 
was within the scope of article 5(1)(f) ECHR.  Since then the signing of the Treaty of Lisbon 
has strengthened claims that this decision was allowing fundamentally a lower threshold than 
that which was allowed through collective reading of international treaties, therefore 
suggesting that unnecessary detention may be contrary to the EU principle of proportionality 
and necessity.  This, in turn, highlighted the opting out of the recast directives, in terms of 
failing to adhere to minimum standards set by the EU, though it was concluded that this may 
be something that emerges in the years to come, depending on the way in which the ECtHR 
and the Court of Justice cooperate. 
Indeed, many specific failings were found in the study of the practical application of Home 
Office policy on the DFT, finding violations of ECHR rights, and EU directive standards.  
The screening process was found to be correctly criticised due to its inadequacy to understand 
the full facts of a case before detaining it, possibly breaching article 18(1) of the Procedures 
directive preventing applicants being detained solely for being asylum applicants and, partly, 
article 12(1) PD relating to personal interviews due to the 99% refusal rate at the substantive 
interview.  Ultimately, this failing can lead to the UK returning an applicant contrary to the 
principle of non-refoulement. 
It was shown that the entry to the DFT for a quick decision seemed to heavily rely on the case 
being “clearly unfounded”, which was linked to a quick decision, though not completely.  
Concern was expressed at the apparent informal arrangement surrounding certain 
nationalities and claims with no merit.  This was proven by the sudden unexplainable spike in 
certain nationalities accepted onto the DFT which was not explained in overall asylum 
figures.  This cast doubt on Home Office decision making, and criticised the lack of 
transparency.   
Access to legal aid was shown to be ineffective in the sense that solicitors did not have 
enough time with clients in order to genuinely act in their best interests and prepare their 
claim.  It was suggested that this breached article 15(1)PD which requires effective 
consultation with the solicitor.  Justice Ouseley in DA has recently explained that more time 
was needed before the substantive interview to reduce the unfairness, though practitioners 
suggested that even this was not sufficient.  Inefficiency was also apparent in the exclusivity 
contracts, with the effect of dampening competiveness and not taking borderline merit cases 
on due to Home Office incentives.   
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The nature of the Fast Track criteria and its power to detain an applicant under the same 
justification of speed was challenged, concluding that this no longer applied to the detainees, 
and therefore they should either be released on bail to hear their appeals, of detained under 
new general criteria, ultimately violating article 5(1) ECHR.  What’s more, it was argued that 
article 39PD detailing the right to appeal and the right to effective remedy and the principle 
of effectiveness jeopardised the appeals process, in particular the 2 day time-limit. 
The much documented vulnerable groups were discussed through the filter of the Home 
Office’s flexibility policy.  It was concluded that the case law had already begun to 
acknowledge the degrading treatment suffered at the hands of wrongfully placed torture 
survivors, mentally ill detainees and trafficking victims akin to article 3 breaches due to its 
vague policies on the subject.  The routine nature of this breach is unacceptable. 
The conditions of detention were examined and it was concluded that, although these were no 
doubt contrary to Saadi, they were not so bad as to trigger an article 5ECHR claim, save in 
the context of the vulnerable groups discussed previously. 
Finally, examination of the period once the DFT had finished and the general criteria were 
applied, found evidence that only 50%-70% of DFT applicants were removed from the UK, 
further to undermining the initial 99% refusal rate that comes with months of subsequent 
detention.  It also concluded from the statistical data that detention only effected removal in 
around half of all cases, with the other half serving a period in detention before being bailed; 
their detention likely served no or little purpose. 
The thesis has shown how far the DFT has evolved beyond recognition from the Saadi 
principles, possibly breaching article 5(1)ECHR in a few ways.  However, it has also 
identified the areas in which it could be approved.  Taken and applied together, the 
concluding recommendations would make for a much fairer accelerated system. 
12 Recommendations 
 Opt-in to the Recast Procedure, Reception and Qualification directives, as well 
as the Returns directive – adhering to minimum EU standards will mean UK 
practices with respect to accelerated procedures are in line with EU principles 
 Reform the screening process – make the process more tailored to gaining 
information needed to correctly route an applicant onto the DFT 
 Increase access to Legal Aid – ensure that the majority of applicants are represented 
at their first appeal 
 Stop applying the Fast Track detention criteria to the Fast Track Appeals 
process – the justification for the accelerated procedures does not fit with this context 
 Apply a period longer than 2 days to appeal a negative decision 
 Reform safeguarding process: Rule 35, Rule 34 – ensure that these examinations 
are delivered early on in the detention by expertly-trained and dedicated professionals. 
 Apply the decision to remove sensibly, taking more serious steps with a view to 
remove the applicant – to avoid a period in detention which is longer than necessary 
 Apply an maximum time limit to detention in the UK 
 
 
34 
 
 
 
 
 
Bibliography 
 
Primary and grey literature 
 
Detention Action, (July 2014) Written evidence to the Parliamentary inquiry into the use of 
immigration detention in the UK, hosted by the APPG on Refugees and the APPG on 
Migration, available online at: 
https://detentioninquiry.files.wordpress.com/2014/07/detention-action-detention-inquiry-
evidence-07141.pdf [accessed 20.07.14] 
 
Home Office, (last modified 1 May 2014) Enforcement Instructions and Guidance: Chapter 
55, version 18.3, available online at: 
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/307995/Chapt
er55.pdf [accessed 09.09.14] 
 
Home Office, (last modified 7 August 2013a) Detention Rule 35 Process – Version 10.0, 
available online at: 
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/257437/rule35
reports.pdf [accessed 08.09.14] 
 
Home Office, (last modified 11 June 2013b) Detained Fast Track Processes – Version 5.0, 
unpublished, available online at: 
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/257435/detain
ed_fast_processes.pdf [accessed 21.07.14] 
 
Home Office, (December 2013c) The Government Response to the Seventh Report from the 
Home Affairs Committee Session 2013-2014 HC 71: Asylum, The Stationery Office Limited: 
UK, available online at: http://www.parliament.uk/documents/commons-committees/home-
affairs/Cm-8769-Asylum-Government-Response.pdf [accessed 30.07.14] 
 
Home Office, (last modified 1 Sept 2012) Detained Fast Track Processes – Timetable 
Flexibility: Version 2.0, unpublished, available online at: 
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/257439/Detain
ed_fast_track_flexi.pdf [accessed 20.07.14] 
 
Migrants’ Law Project (2014) Detained Fast Track – Detention Action, online, available at: 
http://themigrantslawproject.org/our-work/current-cases/detained-fast-track-detention-action/ 
[accessed: 08.09.14] 
 
Oral Evidence Session given to the Inquiry into the use of Immigration Detention (17 July 
2014) at Porticullis house, expert evidence [Phelps, J., Chakrabarti, S., Robjant, J., and 
Katona. C.], victim evidence [Souleymane, Maimuna, Alice, C, M and A], transcript 
35 
 
available at: https://detentioninquiry.files.wordpress.com/2014/07/first-evidence-session-
transcript1.pdf [accessed: 28.07.14] 
 
Phelps, J. (17 July 2014) Detention inquiry oral evidence hearing (transcript in Appendix A), 
Portcullis House: London, online, available at: 
https://detentioninquiry.files.wordpress.com/2014/07/first-evidence-session-transcript1.pdf 
[accessed 30.07.14] 
 
Thomas, R. (12 September 2013) Immigration Judicial Reviews Constitutional Law Group: 
online, available at: http://ukconstitutionallaw.org/2013/09/12/robert-thomas-immigration-
judicial-reviews/ [accessed 03.09.14] 
 
UK Government, (nd) Legal Annex: Asylum and Immigration – Balance of Competences 
Review, online, available at: 
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/270207/asylu
m-immigration-legal-annex.pdf [accessed 04.09.14] 
 
Webb, E. J., Campbell, D. T., Schwartz, R. D., and Sechrest, L. (1966) Unobtrusive 
Measures: Nonreactive Measures in the Social Sciences. Chicago: Rand McNally 
 
Yeo, C (12 September 2013) Injunctions for removals from fast track, The Free Movement 
Immigration Law Blog, Garden Court Chambers: London, online, available at: 
http://www.freemovement.org.uk/injunctions-for-removal-from-fast-track/ [accessed 
23.08.14] 
 
FOI requests 
 
FOI Request 32289, 27.07.14 
FOI Request 32488, 01.09.14 
 
Secondary Literature 
 
Aida, (April 2014) Asylum Information Database, National Country Report: The United 
Kingdom, ECRE (eds.), online, available at: http://www.asylumineurope.org/files/report-
download/aida_-_uk_second_update_final_uploaded.pdf [accessed 13.08.14] 
 
Alexander, V. D., Thomas, H., Cronin, A., Fielding, J., and Moran-Ellis, J., (2008) ‘Mixed 
Methods’ in Gilbert, N., Researching Social Life – Third Edition, SAGE Publications Ltd: 
London 
 
BIDUK (July 2014) Summary: Access to immigration legal advice for immigration detainees 
across the UK detention estate (Surveys 1-8) July 2014, online, available at: 
http://www.biduk.org/966/news/focus-on-the-quality-of-asylum-legal-advice-in-the-uk.html 
[accessed 09.09.14] 
 
BIDUK (2006) Working against the clock: inadequacy and injustice in the fast-track system, 
BIDUK: online, available at: 
file:///C:/Users/Jessica/Downloads/BIDFasttrackReportFINAL%20(2).pdf [accessed 
30.08.14] 
36 
 
 
Bryman, A. (2004) Social Research Methods – Second Edition, Oxford University Press: 
Oxford 
 
Bosworth, M. and Turnbull, S. (June 24, 2014) Immigration Detention and the Expansion of 
Penal Power in the UK. (Forthcoming) In Reiter, K. and Koenig A. (Eds.). ‘Extraordinary 
Punishment: An Empirical Look at Administrative Black Holes in the United States, the 
United Kingdom, and Canada, Palgrave’; Criminal Justice, Borders and Citizenship Research 
Paper Series. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2458343 [accessed 16/07/14] 
 
Buckley, J. (5 December 2011) All About Sovereignty? The UK and EU Asylum Directives, 
eutopia law, matrix chambers: online, available at: http://eutopialaw.com/2011/12/05/all-
about-sovereignty-the-uk-and-eu-asylum-directives/ [accessed 13.07.14] 
 
Cooke, A. (2013) Immigration Detention and the Rule of Law, National Report: United 
Kingdom, Bingham Centre for the Rule of Law: online, available at: 
http://www.biicl.org/files/6568_uk_-_final_bc_edit.pdf [accessed 01.09.14] 
Costello, C. and Hancox, E. (2014) Policy Primer: The UK, The Common European Asylum 
System and EU Immigration Law, University of Oxford, Migration Observatory: online, 
available at: 
http://www.migrationobservatory.ox.ac.uk/sites/files/migobs/UK_EU_Asylum_Law_0.pdf 
[accessed 09.09.14] 
Cutler, S. (2007) “Refusal Factory” Women’s experiences of the Detained Fast Track asylum 
process at Yarl’s Wood Immigration Removal Centre, Bail for Immigration Detainees: 
online, available at: file:///C:/Users/Jessica/Downloads/BID_RefusalFactory_07.pdf 
[accessed 30.08.14] 
Detention Action, (May 2011) Fast Track To Despair: The Unnecessary Detention of Asylum 
Seekers, Detention Action: online, available at: http://detentionaction.org.uk/wordpress/wp-
content/uploads/2011/10/FastTracktoDespair-printed-version.pdf [accessed: 08.08.14] 
 
Detention Action, (Feb 2013) Briefing: The Detained Fast Track, online, available at: 
http://detentionaction.org.uk/wordpress/wp-content/uploads/2011/10/DFT-briefing-final-
February-2013.pdf [accessed 31.07.14] 
 
European Commission, COM (2010) 456 Report from the Commission to the European 
Parliament and the Council on the application of Directive 2005/85/EC of 1 December 2005 
on Minimum Standards of Procedures in Member States for Granting and withdrawing 
Refugee Status, European Commission: Brussels, available at: http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-
content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:52010DC0465&from=EN [accessed: 21.07.14] 
 
European Commission, COM (2007) 745 Report from the Commission to the European 
Parliament and the Council on the application of Directive 2003/9/EC of 27 January 2003 on 
Minimum Standards for the Protection of Asylum Seekers, European Commission: Brussels, 
available at: http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=COM:2007:0745:FIN:EN:PDF [accessed: 
01.09.14] 
37 
 
 
Green, D. [MP], (13 October 2011) UK Will Not Opt Into EU Asylum Directives, Home 
Office: online, available at: https://www.gov.uk/government/news/uk-will-not-opt-in-to-eu-
asylum-directives [accessed 20.07.14] 
 
Hailbronner, K. (eds.) (2010) EU Immigration and Asylum Law – Commentary – Hart 
Publishing: Oxford 
 
Harvey, A. (2013) Legal Aid: Welcome to Laa Laa Land, in ‘Journal of Immigration 
Nationality and Asylum Law’, Vol 27(3), pp. 102-105 
 
Harvey, A. [ILPA] (17 October 2012) Whither Refugee Protection in the Changes to the 
Canadian and British Asylum Systems, ILPA:  online, available at: 
http://www.ceris.metropolis.net/wp-content/uploads/2012/10/12.10.17-Whither-Refugee-
Protection-ARH.pdf [accessed 30.07.14] 
Hillier, M. MP (22 January 2010)  Asylum Qualifications and Procedures Directives 
(14959/09, 14863/09): Parliamentary Under Secretary of State, Home Office, to the 
Chairman, in Home Affairs Sub Committee F, House of Lords, European Union Committee: 
online, available at: http://www.parliament.uk/documents/lords-committees/eu-sub-com-
f/cwm/CWMSubFDec09-Apr10final.pdf [accessed 13.08.14] 
HM Chief Inspector of Prisons (5-16 August 2013a) Report on an unannounced inspection of 
Harmondsworth Immigration Removal Centre, Her Majesty’s Inspectorate of Prisons: 
London, available at: http://www.justice.gov.uk/about/hmi-prisons [accessed: 09.09.14] 
HM Chief Inspector of Prisons (June-Oct 2013b) Report on an unannounced inspection of 
Yarl’s Wood Immigration Removal Centre, Her Majesty’s Inspectorate of Prisons: London, 
available at: http://www.justice.gov.uk/about/hmi-prisons [accessed: 09.09.14] 
HM Chief Inspector of Prisons (Nov 2011) Report on an unannounced full follow-up 
inspection of Harmondsworth Immigration Removal Centre, Her Majesty’s Inspectorate of 
Prisons: London, available at: http://www.justice.gov.uk/about/hmi-prisons [accessed: 
09.09.14] 
Hodkinson, P. (2008) Grounded Theory and Inductive Research, in Gilbert, N. Researching 
Social Life – Third Edition, SAGE Publications Ltd: London 
Home Affairs Committee (HC) (11 October 2013) Asylum: Seventh Report of Session 2013-
14, Volume 1, HC 71: online, available at: 
http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201314/cmselect/cmhaff/71/71.pdf [accessed 
28.08.14] 
Home Office Science (May 2013) Evaluation of the Early Legal Advice Project Final Report 
: Research Report 70Home Office: online, available at: 
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/199962/horr70
.pdf [accessed 03.09.14] 
Office Statistics, (Q2, 2014) Table as_11: Asylum main applicants accepted onto the fast 
track process, by country of nationality, Home Office: online, available at: 
38 
 
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/348583/asylu
m3-q2-2014-tabs.ods [accessed 01.09.14] 
Home Office Statistics, (Q2, 2014) Table as_12: Outcomes of asylum main applicants 
accepted onto the fast track process, Home Office: online, available at: 
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/348583/asylu
m3-q2-2014-tabs.ods [accessed 01.09.14] 
Home Office Statistics, (Q1, 2014) Table as_01: Asylum applications and initial decisions 
for main applicants, by country of nationality 
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/311790/asylu
m1-q1-2014-tabs.ods [accessed 09.09.14] 
 
Home Office Statistics, (Q1, 2014) Table dt_06: People leaving detention by Reason, Sex and 
length of Detention 
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/311803/detenti
on-q1-2014-tabs.ods [accessed 09.09.14] 
Home Office, (July 1998) Fairer, Faster and Firmer – A Modern Approach to Immigration 
and Asylum, The Stationery Office: London, available online at: 
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/264150/4018.p
df [accessed 21.07.14] 
IAC [Independent Asylum Commission] (2008) deserving dignity: The Independent Asylum 
Commission’s Third Report of Conclusions and Recommendations, IAC: online, available at: 
http://www.independentasylumcommission.org.uk/files/10.07.08.pdf [accessed 09.0914] 
ILPA (April 2013, amended May 2013) ILPA note on the “Transformation” Legal Aid 
consultation, ILPA: online, available at: 
http://www.ilpa.org.uk/resources.php/17792/transforming-legal-aid-delivering-a-more-
credible-and-efficient-system-ministry-of-justice-ilpas-ini [accessed 03.09.14] 
ILPA, (January 2008) The Detained Fast Track Process: A Best Practice Guide, Immigration 
Law Practitioners Association: online, available at: 
file:///C:/Users/Jessica/Downloads/ilpa_bpg_detained_fasttrack%20(2).pdf [accessed 
30.08.14]  
JCHR, (22 March 2007) The Treatment of Asylum Seekers: Joint Committee On Human 
Rights – Tenth Report of the Session 2006-07, Volume 1, HL Paper 81-l/HC 60-l: online, 
available at: http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/jt200607/jtselect/jtrights/81/81i.pdf 
[accessed 31.08.14] 
Johnston, C., (2009) Indefinite Detention: Can it be Justified?, in Journal of Immigration 
Asylum and Nationality Law, Vol.23(4), pp.351-364 
Lambert, H. (2012) “Safe third country” in the European Union: an evolving concept in 
international law and implications for the UK, in Journal of Immigration Asylum and 
Nationality Law, Vol 26(4), pp. 318-336 
39 
 
Legard, R., Keegan, J., and Ward, K. (2003) ‘In-depth Interviews’, in Ritchie, J., and Lewis, 
J, Qualitative Research Practice: A Guide for Social Science Students and Researchers, 
SAGE Publications: London 
Medical Justice, (28 January 2014) Das v SSHD: Court of Appeal Judgement on immigrant 
mental health policy, Medical Justice: online, available at: 
http://www.medicaljustice.org.uk/policy-practice-law/case-law-judgements/2253-das-v-sshd-
court-of-appeal-judgment-on-immigrant-mental-health-policy-28-01-14.html [accessed: 
09.09.14] 
Medical Justice, (2013) Mental Health in Immigration Detention Action Group: Initial 
Report 2013, online, available at: 
http://www.medicaljustice.org.uk/images/stories/reports/MHIDAGreportR.pdf [accessed 
14.08.14] 
Medical Justice, (January 2013) Law firms and exclusive contracts for detention centres, 
Medical Justice: online, available at: http://www.medicaljustice.org.uk/asylum-detention-
background/legal-aid-cuts-effect/2039-exclusive-contracts.html [accessed 07.09.14] 
Miller, J. and Glassner, B. (1997) ‘The ‘Inside’ and the ‘Outside’: Finding Realities in 
Interviews, in Silverman, D. (eds.) Qualitative Research: Theory, Method and Practice, 
SAGE Publications: London 
Mole, N. (2000) Asylum and the European Convention of Human Rights, Council of Europe: 
Strasbourg, available at: http://www.echr.coe.int/LibraryDocs/DG2/HRFILES/DG2-EN-
HRFILES-09(2000).pdf [accessed 09.09.14] 
Moreno-Lax, V. (2011) Beyond Saadi v UK: Why the Unnecessary Detention of Asylum 
Seekers is Inadmissible under EU Law, in Human Rights and International Legal Discourse 
Vol 5, pp. 166-206 
Oakley, S. (April 2007) Accelerated Procedures for Asylum in the European Union: Fairness 
vs Efficiency, Sussex Migration Working Paper, no. 43: online, available at: 
https://www.sussex.ac.uk/webteam/gateway/file.php?name=mwp43.pdf&site=252 [accessed: 
09.09.14] 
OJEU (2007) Explanations Relating to the Charter of Fundamental Human Rights in ‘The 
Official Journal of the European Union, No C 303, pp. 1-20 
O’Neill, A. (2011) Is the UK’s ‘opt-out’ from the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights Worth 
the Paper it is Written on?: Part 1, eutopia law: matrix chambers, online, available at: 
http://eutopialaw.com/2011/09/15/is-the-uk%E2%80%99s-%E2%80%9Copt-
out%E2%80%9D-from-the-eu-charter-of-fundamental-rights-worth-the-paper-it-is-written-
on/ [accessed: 09.09.14] 
O’Nions, H. (2008) No Right to Liberty: The Detention of Asylum Seekers for Administrative 
Convenience, in 10 European Journal of Migration & Law, p. 149-185 
40 
 
Peers, S., Guild, E., Arcarazo, D. A.. Groenendilk, K., Moreno-Lax, V. (2012) EU 
Immigration and Asylum Law (Text and Commentary): Second Revised Edition, Volume 2: 
EU Immigration Law, Printforce: The Netherlands 
Phelps, J., (2010) No Return, No Release, No Reason: Challenging Indefinite Detention, 
Detention Action: online, available at: http://detentionaction.org.uk/wordpress/wp-
content/uploads/2011/10/No-Release_Report_WEB1.pdf [accessed: 09.09.14]Piris, J. (2010) 
The Lisbon Treaty: A Legal and Political Analysis Cambridge University Press: Cambridge 
Reneman, M. (2014) Speedy Asylum Procedures in the EU: Striking a Fair Balance between 
the Need to Process Asylum Cases Efficiently and the Asylum Applicant’s EU Right to an 
Effective Remedy, in International Journal of Refugee Law, Vol 25, No, 4, pp. 717-748 
Reneman, M. (2008) Access to an Effective Remedy in European Asylum Procedures, in 
Amsterdam Law Forum, VU University Amsterdam, Vol 1, No 1, online, available at: 
http://amsterdamlawforum.org/article/view/42/50 [accessed 04.09.14] 
Rhee, D. J. (2011) The principle of effective protection: reaching those parts other 
[principles] cannot reach?, BEG/ALBA Conference: Athens, online, available at: 
http://www.adminlaw.org.uk/docs/sc%2012%20Deok%20Joo%20Rhee.pdf [accessed: 
09.09.14] 
RightToRemain (no date) Campaigning Tool Kit, Right To Remain: online, available at: 
http://righttoremain.org.uk/toolkit/screening.html [accessed 13.07.14] 
 
Rooney C (2014) R (Detention Action) v SSHD: A (Partial) Victory Against Detained Fast 
Track  Available at: http://bordercriminologies.law.ox.ac.uk/detention-action-v-
sshd/ (Accessed [31.07.14]) 
 
Robjant, K., Hassan R., and Katona C. (2009) Mental Health Implications of Detaining 
Asylum Seekers: Systematic Review, in The British Journal of Psychiatry, pp.206-312  
 
Shah, P. (2008) CoE Human Rights Commissioner reports on the UK, in Journal of 
Immigration, Nationality and Asylum Law, volume 22(4), p.291 
 
Travis, A. (21 May 2013) Torture victims win test case over detention in UK immigration 
centres, The Guardian: Online, available at: 
http://www.theguardian.com/uk/2013/may/21/torture-victims-win-case-uk-detention 
[accessed 02.09.14] 
 
UK Border Agency, [Home Office] (January 2012) The UK Border Agency Response to the 
independent chief inspector’s report on asylum: a thematic inspection of the Detained Fast 
Track, Home office: online, available at: http://icinspector.independent.gov.uk/wp-
content/uploads/2012/02/UK-Border-Agency-response-to-Detained-Fast-Track-report.pdf 
[accessed 10.07.14] 
 
UNHCR (2012) Detention Guidelines: Guidelines on the Applicable Criteria and Standards  
relating to the Detention of Asylum-Seekers and Alternatives to Detention, UNHCR, 
available at: http://www.unhcr.org/505b10ee9.html [accessed 13.07.14] 
 
41 
 
UNHCR (August 2010) Quality Integration Project: Key Observations and 
Recommendations, UNHCR: online, available at: 
http://www.unhcr.org.uk/fileadmin/user_upload/pdf/First_Quality_Integration_Project_Repor
t_Key_Findings_and_Rec_01.pdf [accessed 14.08.14] 
 
UNHCR (April 2009) Quality Initiative Project: Sixth Report to the Minister, UNHCR: 
online, available at: 
http://www.unhcr.org.uk/fileadmin/user_upload/pdf/QI_Sixth_Report.pdf [accessed 
22.08.14] 
 
UNCAT (2013) Concluding observations on the fifth periodic report of the United Kingdom, 
adopted by the Committee at its fiftieth session (6-31 May 2013), UNCAT: online, available 
at: http://www.justice.gov.uk/downloads/human-rights/cat-concluding-observations-may-
2013.pdf [accessed: 09.09.14] 
 
Westaby, C. (2014) What's culture got to do with it? The emotional labour of immigration 
solicitors in their exchanges with United Kingdom Border Agency case owners, in Web 
Journal of Current Legal Issues, Vol 20, no 1, Web, available online at: 
http://webjcli.org/article/view/298/419 [accessed 03.09.14] 
 
Wilsher, D. (2012) Immigration Detention: Law, History, Politics. Cambridge University 
Press: Cambridge 
 
Hansard 
Roche, B (2000) HC Deb 16 March 2000 vol 346 cc262-4W 
Hughes, B (2003) HC 18 March 2003 vol 401 Col 42WS 
 
Interviews  
 
Immigration Solicitor, Eleanor A. Glass (Solicitor A), Holloway Road, 1st August 2014 
 
Immigration Solicitor, Alex Finch (Solicitor B), London offices (via telephone), 15th August 
2014 
 
Barrister, Nathalie Lieven (Barrister A), London offices (via telephone), 6th September 2014 
 
 
Cases 
Bahaddar v The Netherlands (145/1996/764/965), Strasbourg: European Court of Human 
Rights, 19 February 1998, available at: 
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=001-58136#{"itemid":["001-58136"]} 
[accessed 09.09.14] 
 
Saadi v. United Kingdom, 13229/03, Council of Europe: European Court of Human 
Rights, 29 January 2008, available at: 
http://www.refworld.org/docid/47a074302.html [accessed 23 August 2014] 
 
Saleem v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2001] 1 WLR 443, United Kingdom: 
Court of Appeal, 23 June 2000 
 
42 
 
Maaouia v France (2001) 33 EHRR 42, European Court of Human Rights, 5 October 2000 
 
MMS v Belgium and Greece, 30696/09, European Court of Human Rights: Strasbourg, 21 
January 2011 
 
N.S. (C 411/10) v. Secretary of State for the Home Department and M. E. (C 493/10) and 
others v. Refugee Applications Commissioner, Minister for Justice, Equality and Law 
Reform, C-411/10 and C-493/10, European Union: Court of Justice of the European 
Union, 21 December 2011, available at: http://www.refworld.org/docid/4ef1ed702.html 
[accessed 15.09.14] 
 
S, R (on the application of) v Secretary of State for the Home Department, [2011] EWHC 
2120 (Admin), United Kingdom: High Court, 5 August 2011 
 
BA, R (on the application of) v Secretary of State for the Home Department, [2011] EWHC 
2748 (Admin), United Kingdom: High Court, 26 October 2011 
 
European Parliament v Council of the European Union, (C-540/03) European Court of 
Justice, 27 June 2006 
 
R(L) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2003] EWCA Civ 25; [2003] 1 WLR 
1230, United Kingdom: Court of Appeal, 24 January 2003 
Rewe-Zentral AG v. Bundesmonopolverwaltung für Branntwein (Case 120/78) Court of 
Justice, 20 February 1979 
R (on the application of EO) v. Secretary of State for the Home Department, [2010] EWHC 
3000 (Admin), United Kingdom: High Court (England and Wales), 19 November 2010, 
available at: http://www.refworld.org/docid/4d2c88c42.html [accessed 15 September 2014 
 
The Queen on the application of Pratima DAS v SSHD [2013] EWHC 682 (Admin), United 
Kingdom: Court of Appeal, 28 January 2014 
 
Detention Action v Secretary of State for the Home Department, [2014] EWHC 2245 
(Admin), United Kingdom: High Court (England and Wales), 9 July 2014, available at: 
http://www.refworld.org/docid/53bd255a4.html [accessed 31 July 2014] 
 
Detention Action v Secretary of State for the Home Department, [2014] EWHC 2525 
(Admin), United Kingdom: High Court, 25 July 2014 
 
R (JB) Jamaica v. The Secretary of State for the Home Department, [2013] EWCA Civ 
666, United Kingdom: Court of Appeal (England and Wales), 12 June 2013, available at: 
http://www.refworld.org/docid/51d29a4a4.html [accessed 13 August 2014] 
 
R (on the application of Refugee Legal Centre) v. Secretary of State for the Home 
Department, [2004] EWCA Civ 1239, United Kingdom: Court of Appeal (England and 
Wales), 16 September 2004, available at: 
http://www.refworld.org/docid/4a8173e42.html [accessed 31 July 2014] 
 
(R. (on the application of Saadi and others) v. Secretary of State for the Home 
Department [2001] EWHC Admin 670), United Kingdom: Administrative Court, 7 
43 
 
September 2001, available at: http://www.refworld.org/pdfid/3bab3d9ac.pdf [accessed 
23.07.14] 
 
R -v- A Special Adjudicator and Secretary of State for Home Department ex parte B [1997] 
EWHC Admin 1148; [1998] Imm AR 182; [1998] INLR 315, 17 December 1997 
 
R (on the application of Suckrajh) v. (1) Asylum and Immigration Tribunal and (2) The 
Secretary of State for the Home Department, [2011] EWCA Civ 938, United Kingdom: Court 
of Appeal (England and Wales), 29 July 2011, available at: 
http://www.refworld.org/docid/4e38024f2.html [accessed 18 August 2014] 
 
R v. Secretary of State for the Home Department, Ex Parte Saadi (FC) and Others 
(FC), [2002] UKHL 41, United Kingdom: House of Lords (Judicial Committee), 31 October 
2002, available at: http://www.refworld.org/docid/3dc7b1647.html [accessed 23 August 
2014] 
 
Nadarajah and another v SSHD [2003] EWCA Civ 1768, United Kingdom: High Court 
(England and Wales), 8 December 2003, available at: 
http://www.bhattmurphy.co.uk/media/files/Nadarajah_and_Another_v_SSHD_2003.pdf 
[accessed 23.08.14] 
 
Instruments 
 
Council Directive 2005/85/EC of 1 December 2005 on minimum standards on procedures in 
member states for granting and withdrawing refugee status (Procedures Directive/PD) 
 
Council Directive 2013/32/EU of 26 June 2013 on common standards on procedures in 
member states for granting and withdrawing refugee status (Recast) [Recast Procedures 
Directive/RPD] 
 
Council Directive 2004/83/EC of 29 April 2004 on minimum standards for the qualification 
and status of third country nationals or stateless persons as refugees or as persons who 
otherwise need international protection and the content of the protection granted 
(Qualifications Directive/QD) 
 
Directive 2011/95/EU of 13 December 2011 on standards for the qualification and status of 
third country nationals or stateless persons as refugees or as persons who otherwise need 
international protection and the content of the protection granted (Recast) [Recast 
Qualifications Directive/RQD] 
 
Directive 2008/115/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council on 16 December 2008 
on common standards and procedures in Member States for returning illegally staying third-
country nationals (Returns Directive/RD) 
 
Council Directive 2003/9/EC of 27 January 2003 laying down minimum standards for the 
reception of asylum seekers (Reception Directive/RD) 
 
Directive 2013/33/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 June 2013 laying 
down minimum standards for the reception of applicants for international protection (recast) 
[Recast Reception Directive/RRD] 
44 
 
 
Regulation (EU) No 604/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 June 
2013 (Dublin III) 
 
Convention determining the State responsible for examining applications for asylum lodged 
in one of the Member States of the European Communities 97/C 254/01 (Dublin Regulation) 
 
The Asylum and Immigration Tribunal (Fast Track Procedure) Rules SI 2005 No. 560 
http://www.legislation.gov.uk/uksi/2005/560/made 
 
Immigration Act 1971, chapter 77 
 
European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms 
(European Convention on Human Rights/ECHR) 
 
2013 Standard Civil Contract, Specification: Category Specific Rules, online: available at: 
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/308762/LAA-
2013-immigration-and-asylum-specification.pdf [accessed 09.08.14] 
 
European Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union (2010/C 83/02) ([EU] 
Charter) 
 
Treaty on the Functioning of The European Union (TFEU) 
 
Treaty of Lisbon Amending the Treaty on European Union and The Treaty Establishing The 
European Community (2007/C 306/01) (Treaty of Lisbon/TEU) 
 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) 
 
1951 Convention and 1967 Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees (1951 Refugee 
Convention) 
 
The United Nations Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading 
Treatment or Punishment (Convention against Torture) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Appendix 11 
 
 
 
                                                          
1 (Home Office Statistics, (Q2, 2014) as_11) 
 Appendix 2 
 
Eleanor Glass interview (Solicitor A) 
1st August 2014, Holloway Road 
 
1. What do you find the most frustrating thing about dealing with detainees on the fast track? 
I don’t often deal with clients on fast track, and it’s because of a problem with the fast track, 
that they basically are anonymous people that are in detention, and because they get put on 
fast track and because they qualify for legal aid usually means that often they just get 
allocated a lawyer and we never meet them until it’s too late basically.  We only come across 
them when a charity like Detention Action refers them to us after having coming across them.  
But you hear horror stories all the time of what happens to those clients. 
2.  When it is too late often what part of the system are they when it’s too late? 
Um normally it will be sort of working towards removal, after the decision.  Normally, well 
not normally, it’s supposed to move very quickly.  So normally the negative decisions come 
very quickly.  There are cases when people are just left on fast track, and it’s not fast at all, 
but once they actually say OK we don’t believe your asylum claim, they’ve gone through the 
whole appeals process very very quickly, and then they try and remove them.  And then when 
it’s circumstances like the don’t have identity documents, to actually be removed with 
anyway and stuff like that, and then they can get stuck in the whole detention system out of 
fast track I mean the normal detention process. 
3. Yes, often once the negative decision has been given, maybe when they still have appeals 
or when their appeals have been exhausted, they end up being treated like someone who 
hasn’t been on the fast track who’s been detained. 
Yes, they become a normal detainee.  They are a non-fast track detainee.  They’ve completed 
that process, and they’ve been shoved onto the next general, people they are generally trying 
to remove.  Now if they’ve never been outside of the detention centre, they are not going to 
be able to have formed any links with anybody and they have to rely on charities or 
somebody in the detention centre to help them, because you know a lot of them won’t be able 
to speak English, they won’t have any financial means you need to get in touch with people. 
4. In terms of the law, they have to apply certain criteria in order to hold the detainees in the 
centre, and the detained fast track criteria to detain someone is slightly different to the people 
who are in normal detention, is that right? 
Um, it’s like, people in detained on the detained fast track are, well they are put there because 
it is believed that their asylum case can be decided quickly and mostly that’s not true because 
when you’re talking about someone’s life and history it does get very complicated and you 
know there is hidden depth that you’ll never be able to find.  But once people are actually in 
detention to be removed, um, a decision has already been made that they can be removed.  
Well, it should have been made, it’s not always but it should have been.  Um and they should 
only really be detained if removal is imminent.  That is what is supposed to happen.  Whereas 
detained fast track clients, they can just detain them.  Um there’s that criteria that isn’t, you 
know, the decision may be imminent, but the actual removal could never be imminent, as you 
have to go through the process.  
5. I always find it strange that have Short Term Holding Facilities that they put people in 
when removal is really imminent, and that fact that they are also allowed to detain people 
because removal is imminent for a longer period in detention centres.  Does that ever come 
up? 
It’s not really something that becomes important within a case, it’s just something that’s 
interesting within the process and procedure.  I mean SSHFs are often used when people are 
being transferred to larger detention centres, because there is often not spaces sometimes.  
I’ve had a client that has been held in a shot term holding facility for like a week, even 
though they are not supposed to be at all, it’s supposed to be 2 days, because what they will 
do is they will try and confuse the system by actually saying OK we’re going to take you 
somewhere else.  And they take them somewhere else for like half a day and then bring them 
back.  And it is part of (although I think we are quite cynical) but I think most people 
working in the sector would say that they do it on purpose to these people to try and 
encourage them to agree to removal.  I mean there is some times when, even if they want to, 
they can’t agree to removal, because they don’t have the travel documents to do it.   
6. On average, how many times is that the case that the travel documents are the barrier to 
removal? 
Um, I’ve come across it a lot, a lot.  Especially with long term detainees, that is the real 
problem.  I mean once someone has been there for I mean even 3 months, but once 
someone’s been there a year, 2, 3, 4 years which we see, um, you know clearly there’s a 
problem. And removal is no longer possible.  We had a client who now has status.  But was 
held in um, it was true that he did frustrate the process he did fake his identity but they kept 
him in a high security prison for 5 years after his sentence after he was due for release, under 
the immigration act.  But what they did at the time is that they would move him from 
different prisons, from prison to prison, and back and forth, back and forth, to try and unsettle 
him, and he had no idea where he’d be from one day to the next.  But he still managed to be 
there for 5 years. 
7. And was his crime particularly serious was that what it was? 
Um he, I think they perceived it to be quite serious, but actually when you look at the 
circumstances surrounding what had happened they weren’t anywhere near.  You saying 
certain names of an offence that you know strikes a chord… I don’t know if you say like 
robbery, then robbery can be many different things and there are many different levels, so, 
you know.  They get treated at the highest level the whole time even if they have done 
everything that they can to reform and if they have completed their sentence, they’ve done 
rehabilitation during it means nothing, because they will always be an offender in the eyes of 
the home office.   
8. Have you ever had a situation for example where you’re representing a client, and the fact 
that they move from one IRC to the other disrupts the way that you can help them? 
Yeah absolutely it’s happened a number of times.  One of the biggest problems is when they 
move them to Scottish detention centres, Dungavel, so suddenly you are not able to act 
anymore because the law and procedure up there is different and they are better served by 
somebody a Scottish lawyer who actually understands the systems up there, because you 
wouldn’t be acting in the client’s best interests if you carry on.  And that can be really 
problematic.  And also um I mean because we don’t do legal aid it’s not so much of a 
problem for us, but we see it all the time with legal aid solicitors.  Suddenly they are unable 
to represent their clients anymore, um depending on the circumstances. 
And what might also happen is, so we’ve got someone who has been detained at the moment, 
who is not, I’m not acting in his immigration case for him I’m doing something else for him 
but he has a legal aid solicitor.  He’s not getting on very well with them and um he doesn’t 
necessarily what them to represent him in his asylum anymore but there is three firms only 
contracted at the detention centre he is in um one doesn’t have a very good reputation, the 
other not so much, and then there’s one good one.  But the chances of him getting with that 
firm are really really very slim.  And if he doesn’t get any of those and he loses his current 
solicitor then he’s stuck there.  And we will have to work, do it pro bono or something has to 
happen.  So I don’t know but there is a lot of that.  That’s the problem of the new legal aid 
system – moving people around the detention estate. 
9. So it’s a new thing, moving people around? 
Well the detention contracts, I’m not entirely sure when it started but I think it was like 3 
years ago roughly like that.  So before that anybody could represent anybody in a detention 
centre, it was just when they started limiting legal aid that that happened.  And so now only 
certain firms go into those detention centres.   
This guy for example who is in detention now, he was represented by them prior to going into 
detention, he is allowed to stay with that firm, when he was transferred to detention, it’s just 
that if he loses them that it’s hard so if you are instructed previously it’s fine.  But if you lose 
them that’s a problem.  But it’s ridiculous because how can 3 firms represent a whole 
detention centre.  It’s not possible.  It’s impossible.  Most of them don’t and they just sit 
there.  And they don’t have anyone to represent them or do anything for them.  You end up 
having other detainees doing the representation for them, you know, filling in bail 
applications and all those things.  Which they don’t know what they’re, I mean, they might 
have some experience but they don’t really know what they are doing, they try hard, but what 
can they do.  So. 
10.  How often do you agree with the Home office decisions? 
In a very generalised way I can understand their aim of the home office and what they are 
trying to achieve.  The problem is that it doesn’t work.  I’ve known a clients now in a 
personal capacity but I met him in 2009 through Detention Action.  He had section 4 
accommodation for after detention and he lived in the same accommodation for the last 2 and 
a half years.  He’s just been moved to new accommodation nearer Heathrow, that way, and 
it’s like um he says it’s like an apartment blocks and he said it’s so weird because he walked 
there and suddenly he saw all these faces he knew from detention, and it’s all those people 
who are kept in detention for so long and they were all eventually released one after the other 
and back into the community and that’s because it doesn’t work.  So they have just spent 
millions of pounds detaining all these people, they are probably most of them are getting 
compensation because they have been unlawfully detained I imagine um and now they are 
having to pay for their housing in the community as well.  I mean it’s just absolute evidence 
that it doesn’t work.  It’s crazy.  And the effect, it’s completely underrated the impact on the 
people who are detained and because it has become so normalised now even the judges are 
fed up of it.  All these judges who are deciding unlawful detention claims, but they don’t 
actually, they think that 2 years actually is a fine amount of time now, whereas before that 
was scandalous.  And the Home Office would have been punished. 
11. So what changed do you think, do you think everyone just got used to it? 
Yeah, it became normal.  Just normalised it I think.  And the judges got fed up, everyone gets 
fed up, it’s just not a constructive system.  I mean they do need to remove people, I don’t like 
that, I don’t believe in it in a sort of general philosophy but I understand that they do need to 
do it.  But um the decision to detain needs to be taken very seriously.  If that was a British 
citizen that was being detained um the reaction would be very different.  If that was one of 
Theresa May’s family members who was put in detention it would cause uproar.  I think the 
problem is that people making decisions end up thinking about the applicants as if they’re 
names, numbers, animals even.  It’s just they, they’re not human. 
12. In terms of bail applications, do you agree mostly with the home office’s decision to 
refuse? 
The Home Office decision for bail are absolutely rubbish.  So request for Temporary 
Admission – those are never never granted ever – ever.  I’ve never ever come across a request 
for temporary admission that’s been granted.  Um occasionally people if there is a really 
really strong case, and we’ve asked and we’ve submitted for example a rule 35 report asking 
for temporary admission then a little while later they will release them but they’ll never put it 
into writing saying we’ve accepted your request for temporary admission.  They might 
eventually act on it, but mostly it’s always a written refusal.  And then when you make your 
bail application, the requirements now, or what you need to be able to be granted bail for an 
immigration judge to grant bail are mostly incredible sums of money, impossible requests, 
the judges who decide immigration bail generally are known to always refuse.  Depending 
where you are, which court house you go to – Taylor House is known to be slightly better 
than Hatton Cross and different ones, but you will get refused unless you really really put in 
you know £1000, sureties – you’ve got 2 very credible sureties, you’ve got a good address to 
go to, you know you’ve got so many different things, um that’s the only way. 
The problem is that you can turn up for a bail hearing as well and you could get, the detainee 
could have travelled there 5 hours just to get to the hearing just to be immediately told no.  
But just because obviously one judge will say oh we need this bank statement and another 
judge would never have thought that and said oh we need something else, and even if you try 
and prepare fully, you’ll never know exactly what’s going to be in a judge’s mind.  And then 
now you’re not going to be able to apply, you have to wait a month to reapply.  And they’re 
changing the law again for bail in the immigration act.   
13. Does the new immigration act affect bail, or is it just affecting the appeal? 
Er there is changes for bail and I’m not actually up to speed with it yet, but it’s because they 
don’t know what’s going to be brought in definitely yet, when.  But mostly everything is 
worrying in that act.  And it’s really scary how quickly the act went through. And the 
removal aspect is really really scary, the fact that they don’t have to give notice of removal 
anymore.  They can just basically say you’re an overstayer, we are going to remove you later.  
Obviously you can Judicial Review it but it’s not the same, so that’s really scary isn’t it, we’ll 
see what happens.   
14. How often do you think that the Home Office makes the wrong decision to detain 
someone on the DFT? 
From the statistics that I’ve seen, the likelihood is that if you are put on DFT you will be 
refused.  And that’s no matter what your circumstances are.  And it strikes me that people 
that they just choose to be put on the system, they can’t all be false.  Because how it doesn’t 
make, even if you wanted to, well however you look at it doesn’t make any statistical sense 
from what I hear from charities and other solicitors is that generally the decision will be 
flawed. And it’s not surprising because people have got no time to actually prepare and they 
don’t know that they are going to be put on Detained Fast Track before they come here.  And 
they won’t often have the documents, so if you can’t prove a case because you don’t have the 
documents, you don’t have the language skills, you don’t have a proper solicitor or any of 
those things, then the likelihood is you’re going to get refused because you can’t prove your 
case.  So it follows that a lot of those decisions will be flawed. 
15. Because this relates to the fact that the Home Office makes the decision a bit too early 
(after the screening interview) to put them on DFT, before they have enough information to 
make an informed decision. 
Yeah they do it almost immediately.  That is certainly a problem.  They used to say that the 
white list was not what they used for this purpose, but actually it’s quite clear I think that 
when you look at the type of people that they are detaining on the DFT that may not be so 
true.  And more often than not it’s single men of a certain age from certain countries um they 
will be on that list you know you, almost to a point that when you see asylum seekers who 
aren’t on that list, I mean who aren’t on the Detained Fast Track, you look at them and you 
think, why not? You know.  Not that you want them to be but you just think oh that’s funny 
because you just expect them to be now.  Nigeria, I think Nigeria, I mean the political system 
now is slightly different now but I think generally it’s been a nationality that you think yeah 
you’re definitely going to be on the DFT.  Once that decision has been made the decision has 
been made.  It’s very very difficult then to upturn it. 
16. The Refugee Law Centre case in 2004 was lost to the Home Office, but out of that case 
the Home Office was ordered to be more flexible which they claimed to have done.  In your 
experience, are they more flexible in terms of dealing with DFT cases? 
In my experience and what I hear mostly is even if you’re going to try and get them of the 
DFT you really need something strong, to take them off the DFT.  It’s very difficult, once 
they’re in that mindset, and it happens across the board with the Home Office, I find that it’s 
very difficult once you’re in a certain department and have been put on a certain plan, just to 
get them to see something else and listen to representation.  I mean knowledge 
representations are so so difficult, you really need to have a strong medical report for strong 
expert evidence whatever it is that you can get your hands on really to try and change it.  But 
you know to be able to do it by writing a letter without having anything else to back it up it’s 
not going to happen. 
17. How many unlawful detention claims do you make? 
We don’t really do unlawful detention solely, we have had unlawful detention claims 
connected with some of our cases in the past, but I have tended to refer them to other firms to 
do unlawful detention.  People I know have had unlawful detention claims and have won 
quite significant sums of money by doing so.  Not that they can access it, but!  Because they 
can’t open a bank account so.  It’s a big issue for people who have never had a bank account 
before their detention then they actually can’t open an account. 
18. What are the strongest grounds for unlawful detention, it’s not really length of time 
anymore is it? 
Um no, it depends on the personal circumstances of that case, so a few that happened around 
the same time where the Somali cases where this European case of Subi and Elming came out 
hih basically said you can’t be returned to Somalia Alshbab will get you! That’s basically you 
will be in danger wherever you go so that was a case that made quite a big difference – once 
that came out any Somalis that were detained couldn’t be returned automatically they sort of 
unlawfully detained them or it became unlawful to remove them, and I think it’s the same 
with (over the years depending on the countries but) Zimbabwe and a few others.  So there 
are situations like that where an actual country would qualify.  Or maybe um for example er 
talking about Uganda – I mean they passed the anti-homosexuality law then and you could 
prove your client to be homosexual (although that’s another point of contention about how 
the Home Office treat homosexuals), but it is situations like that where it is indisputably 
going to cause you serious harm on your return, and your detention therefore becomes 
unlawful.  Now there’s been cases where you think that people should qualify for unlawful 
detention but they don’t and sometimes the reasons that are given for that are surprising.  
Quite often now more so than before is that we are using what the actions of the detainee 
have been and they sort of accept that the Home Office may be does struggle with the sort of 
capacity it has to make this decision – a huge decision.  But it shouldn’t be that way because 
the statutory rules and limitations and requirements on them to review detention and things 
should be in stone.  But I think, like I said before about the immigration judges they get fed 
up and bored of hearing about it – it’s normalised now.  So it’s literally like it’s no big deal 
anymore.  And as far as I understand it unlawful detention clams are generally weaker now 
than they ever have been.  It’s difficult for me to say though because I haven’t had much 
interaction with them recently but there was a period of time I was quite involved with that 
and from what I hear it’s not… and I’ve noticed some surprising decisions that I’ve thought 
now how could that be.   
The other thing is article 3 we’ve had a spate of article 3 cases where their detention was 
found to be unlawful but that’s like the highest level that you can make I mean that was even 
possibly in the balance you didn’t know that case was going to win.  I’m talking about people 
who have extreme mental health problems and are known to have suffered serious torture or 
similar scenarios – there is a policy that says those people should never be detained so. 
The thing is is that the detention estate can never deal with the multitude of issues raised by 
having that many detainees with different experiences, whether they are Foreign National 
Prisoners, whether they are over stayers, and as a case worker having to deal with these 
people even if you were arguing with a specialist group I think it must be overwhelming.  
And I think anyone would struggle to be in their position.  It doesn’t make it OK but 
something needs to be changed, although it looks like they are getting worse. 
19. As a consequence of the DA v SSHD case, the Home Office have agreed to let clients 
have 4 clear days with their solicitor to prepare for the case.  The idea being that more time to 
prepare will iron out the problems highlighted by the claimant.  Is 4 days enough in your 
opinion? 
I mean when you’re talking about a legal aid firm, and legal aid solicitor that is allocated to 
DFT, I mean they are obviously on the list but without warning you have to drop everything 
and all their other cases for 4 days to make the most of the tie for it to have any sort of 
impact.  Because you are switching from case to case, you can only have a certain amount of 
time to fit people in.  That type of deadline is very very difficult for people to work from.  
And actually it doesn’t give you enough time to be able to obtain any of the connections that 
you would need.  If you’re lucky you might be able to get a doctor to come in to assess them, 
but you’re not going to be able to get any documents from abroad, you’re not going to be able 
to get any translation in that time, the likelihood is you’re not going to be able to get the 
necessary appointments for people wo need to assess that client in that time.  In my opinion, 
you need at least 2 weeks, not that that would solve the problem but even to begin to try and 
think about having any redeeming features of it at all – at least 2 weeks minimum.   
Saying that though, it just does not work, however you look at it, it is never going to work but 
4 days is certainly not enough. 
20. In terms of Foreign National Prisoners, once they have been given a sentence of 12 
months or more, they are automatically given removal directions. 
Yes they automatically qualify, the secretary of state is required to deport them.  
21. And that means that they can be held in prison indefinitely.  (Sol: basically yeah) That 
would just never happen to a British citizen just ever, would it? 
Normal procedure for immigration detainees in prison is that immigration detention begins 
from normally after half of the sentence has been served so you don’t normally do a full 
sentence anyway.  But in fact you would probably end up doing a full sentence because you 
will be held under immigration powers, if not longer.  But yeah, you’d never be held longer 
than what is set by the judges and by law, if you did, again it’s one of those situations where 
there would be public outcry; it doesn’t matter if you’re a foreigner.  
22. The public opinion is quite in line with that as well isn’t it? 
Yeah I think that’s probably right.  I think it is generally thought you know the sort of daily 
mail type heading which says: if you have come to this country, then you can pay for it, 
whatever that may entail.  And it doesn’t matter if that client it very very vulnerable.  And 
actually in some cases it takes very very little to get a 12 month sentence.  They serve half the 
sentence and they assume that they would be due for parole.  Because they get a due release 
date.  We’ve had people who have never been told that they might be detained after, so they 
are expecting to be released and then they are not handing out any information and then 
suddenly, they continue to be held, and this is quite common.  When I first started, when they 
started holding people in prison we were really shocked that immigration detainees would be 
in a prison after they had finished their sentence.  They might have been moved to the slightly 
higher security part of Colnbrook but that was accepted – maybe slightly higher security but 
you are allowed to have a phone, your visiting system is more relaxed and flexible, there are 
so many different advantages you know, as it’s nearer to the freedom that you should get.  
It’s easier to get in touch with your lawyer as well, which is one of the main things.  We’ve 
had clients who have been in prison, they may have had for example a criminal solicitor but 
now also need an immigration solicitor, but they are not necessarily allowed to have both 
solicitors on their call list, but they might want to have a charity on there as well, they might 
want to have family but they are very limited – depending on which prison you are held in 
determines your rules governing your call list in terms of how much time you get and how 
long you get.  And if you only have 5 seconds to speak to your solicitor then there is no way 
that you can take instructions.  And you might need to take instructions from them because 
you suddenly get a letter from the home office, but you have to then write to them, they then 
don’t get that letter for 3 days maybe and then how long does it take for them to get back to 
you, do they even have the means to write back to you if you haven’t enclosed a stamped 
address envelope.  By that time you might have had a week and a half go past, but the whole 
situation could have changed.  You’ve not been able to take instructions, the Home Office 
has tried to issue some type of notice or intention or whatever but you can’t even tell with 
them – it’s crazy and frustrating.  I had a client and there were certain things that he needed to 
prove about his case, but the only way he could do it was having more freedom because he 
needed to get to contact people because he had his documents and things at home, which only 
he would be able to go through – he had to prove who he was and what background he had 
and what schools he’d gone to and all this but there was no way he could do it.  It was 
impossible.  It was for us to make those investigations which a) is impractical because we just 
don’t have the practical ability to do it and b) we aren’t special investigators you know and 
there is not infinite money- you have limited time and limited money so there is only so much 
that you can do and we will do whatever we can.  But a lot of that it can’t be achieved 
without the actual help of the client. 
23. What do you think of HMP The Verne that has recently opened? 
It seems to be slightly coincidental seeing how many FNPs they have held in prisons 
currently.  To be honest it’s not actually that surprising, if that’s what they are going to do, as 
soon as they introduced this temporary policy to detain FNPs in prison after their sentence it 
was obvious – once they make a decision like that they are never going to go back on it – 
they ever do.  It can only become more restrictive, at least that has been our experience.  So 
it’s not really surprising that they want to open up a prison for FNPs solely where they can 
manage them in that way.  Obviously I don’t agree with that but I guess with enough 
campaigning potentially that could be beneficial for FNPs in detention because it might be 
easier to say that those people should get more rights than they would in prison, because if 
you are in a prison system and you have a mix of people, how can you say well that person is 
allowed to have more time on the phone than that other person.  You can’t control it in that 
way.  Whereas if they were all allocated to just one centre then potentially they might be 
allowed some more flexibility I don’t know but it remains to be seen what’s going to happen.  
It would make perfect sense and would not be surprising if they are holding both FNPs and 
detainees who haven’t offended in The Verne, though it is difficult to know what they are 
actually doing.  It’s really worrying. 
The other thing that struck me about the prison situation is that a lot of the prisons are really 
remote so if you want to go and take instructions from somebody in prison, like I had to do, 
you can get to where it was but it took me so long to get there, I ended up having I think a 45 
minute cab from the train station into the middle of the countryside, and then had infinite 
problems trying to get in to the prison itself even though it had all been pre booked and pre-
arranged, and then actually we didn’t even have a private room it was one open room with 
people taking instructions all in this one room.  It was crazy.  And a very limited time as well 
the time I was given was about half the time that we had been allocated.  And you travel 
however many hours to get there to sit there for not even an hour, which is unsustainable for 
a private or legal aid firm that needs to keep their business going.  People won’t go because it 
is ineffective.  That particular case I never even got paid for it.  And when things like that 
happen it does make you think again when you hear of somebody else in that similar 
situation, you just think can I afford, for the sake of my other clients to travel all that way for 
such a short amount of time, for not much professional reward.  The upshot though of us 
thinking that way is that people get abandoned.  And getting abandoned in a prison is 
probably the last place that you are going to get abandoned. 
There’s always records to be broken – at the moment the longest detention period I’ve dealt 
with was 5 year but I have heard other cases being longer.  It’s a huge part of anybody’s life.  
And the worst thing about it is that the drama doesn’t end once you get released um you’re 
just partially free.  My friend has been released now for over 3 years and he’s still in limbo, 
still waiting still nothing happening. Can’t work, that’s it so yeah.  
Interviewer: Thank you so much for answering my questions it’s been really useful. 
Elly: No problem! 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Appendix 3 
 
Transcript of Interview with Alex Finch, (Solicitor B) 
Fri 15th August (typed up 16th) via telephone 
 
1. What is your background, who do you work with? 
 
I qualified as a solicitor in 2010 and was working at that time for Thompson and Co solicitors 
which is, um, sorry I meant to ask you before. You’re not planning to publish this? The firm 
has a contract with detainee fast track. Doing detainee Fast Track (DFT) work fairly regularly 
from 2012/2011. We also conducted legal surgeries. I was involved in detainee DFT as a case 
worker, doing that and bail hearings. I think I did approach detention action group (or 
something similar) a few years ago trying to provide some help but they never got back to 
me. I have now left legal aid and I’m not practising, I’m no longer regulated. I’m a non-
practicing solicitor. I am on the role as a solicitor but non-practicing. I no longer work in 
legal aid I only do private work now. My knowledge of DFT is at least 9 months old. 
 
 
2. When you were working with the legal aid with the people on DFT, how flexible did 
you find the home office was? Particularly in the initial stages of allocating them legal aid. 
How flexible were they in giving you more time, to get the representations together before 
the substantive interview, and flexible in terms of being able to take them off the DFT if you 
felt as if they shouldn’t have been on it? 
 
Um, that’s a very good question, I’m just thinking. I would say that, erm, there was a – I 
would say that there were medical reasons for – I would say firstly that most detainee 
FastTrack case workers were aware of the criteria for, um, for exercising flexibility. They’ve 
got their flexibility policy, um, and they’re aware of what the document says. But the 
documents can be interpreted either conservatively or liberally, and, er, so the areas in which 
they adopted a very restrictive, um, – let me put it another way – the areas where they were, 
er, adopting what I would consider as a reasonable interpretation of the flexibility policy were 
in the medical cases – so where someone was literally saying ‘hi I’m unwell I can’t be 
interviewed’ or where there was substantiated evidence of torture, but where, um, in my 
experience, er, in other cases, so not involving direct medical grounds, the detainee FastTrack 
caseworkers were very poor at exercising flexibility because the timescales for example 
where further documentary evidence had to be obtained and time was required to do that, um, 
they were, I can’t remember an instance in which they did exercise flexibility. And many of 
the cases in which they did refuse to extend timetables then went on appeal and on appeal the 
court did then give more time but, er, erm, even though the home office is supposed to 
actually be a primary decision maker, in my view that was inconsistent with the, I mean the 
home office is supposed to make a decision that is supposed to be standing up by itself, 
whether the claimant qualifies for asylum; in practice they tended to view the totality of the 
process. So their initial decision and then the decision of the judge as the primary decision so 
they would be satisfied if, um, they just initially wrote down all the reasons why the claim 
should be refused and then see what happens on appeal, is generally the attitude. So, where 
more time is required to collect more evidence, um, which is going to be relevant to issues in 
appeal, they are very poor. 
 
3. In terms of, let’s say, somebody who claims to be tortured, obviously claiming to 
having been tortured is not enough for them to assume you were, but did you also find that to 
be a problem, if you had to obtain further evidence that they were tortured (like an 
independent report). Would they be inflexible with regards to that? 
 
Erm, well, can I offer you an anecdote? That might be more useful to you than a general 
judgment about whether they were good or not. I had a client who was from Pakistan. So he 
was claiming to have been stabbed shortly before he left for the UK and he said during his 
interview, um,  at which I was present, sorry I can’t remember if it was an interview, but he 
certainly said during the asylum interview: ‘go and look in my bag which is in reception at 
Harmondsworth it contains my tunic with my blood all over it’. And they literally said to him 
‘erm, we can’t go and look in your bag’. Erm, they refused his asylum claim, and at the 
appeal (laughs), it was quite a dramatic moment for me because I was the advocate for him, 
er, we were then able to get his bag, because it then turns up at court when at Hatton Cross, 
he was able to pull it out of the storage bag that it was in, in front of the judge, revealing that 
it was indeed covered in (someone’s) blood, erm, I don’t know if it was really his blood, it 
was a pretty compelling moment and we won the asylum appeal, but the home office had 
opposed all attempts to facilitate getting hold of that tunic. It’s not just a question of 
flexibility; it also a question of their coordinating flexibly with the detention centres because 
whether he can get hold of his tunic (which is in his bag) is also dependent of 
Harmondsworth erm which is run by Serco, which is run by the home office, um, so it’s not 
just a question of what the home office are doing, so much as there’s a whole shebang of 
Serco, GO and the home office all sort of working together but it’s just absolutely crazy that 
they ended up losing this appeal which, a). they should’ve just said ‘right let’s work out a 
way that we can have a look at this tunic’ um, if they’d done that, firstly, if that was his blood 
then they should’ve allowed his asylum appeal originally and if it wasn’t, they could’ve had a 
good look at it and might’ve been able to determine, erm, you know, earlier, but.... 
 
4. If a client of yours was put on the DFT and you strongly believed that he shouldn’t 
have been on the DFT because he met one of the exclusion criteria, was there a procedure 
that you could use to get them off the DFT that worked? 
Well, no, I mean it’s also possible to make representations. But I would say that the 
representations were at least dealt with by the fast track and at least Harmondsworth, even if 
the response was usually ‘no’, at least they did respond fairly quickly to any of questions of 
temporary admission if you write them a letter as soon as you realise what’s happening 
saying ‘he’s got to be released because of blah blah blah’ they’ll write back their letter saying 
no because we might lose him and then you’ll apply for bail. 
 
5. Was it possible to apply for bail before the substantive interview?  
 
Before the substantive interview, no. You won’t be able to get a bail listing because you get 
told about the nature of the client and have a possible opportunity to speak to him you know 
about 24 hours before. 
 
6. So the only thing that you could do would be to make representations, even though 
they were dealt with, they weren’t usually successful? 
 
You’d have to, yep, er, make the representations at the interview. Say during the interview 
that he’s being prejudiced for whatever reason and then on a PLR visa the whole process has 
been corrupted from the beginning because of this procedural deficit 
 
Theoretically you could lodge a judicial review, sorry not a judicial review, theoretically you 
could lodge a habeus corpus but in practice, no, probably incredibly unlikely.  
 
7. So even though you believed he shouldn’t be put on the DFT, even though there are 
technically options available to you, they didn’t tend to work. You’d have to wait for the 
substantive interview? 
 
Well, I mean, to apply a habeus corpus, you’d have to apply to the legal services 
commissions, I mean I think you’d have to apply to the legal services commission (or 
whatever it’s called now), erm, to get funding. The solicitor in question, even if they believed 
that there were some sort of grounds for arguing that there was unlawfulness in the detention, 
they would be investing substantial time in applying for funding, erm, to go for habeus 
corpus, and to represent people in that situation effectively requires an enormous 
commitment of time and energy on the part of the solicitor.  
 
8. In terms of bail, because we were moving onto bail, did you find that you were in 
agreement with the bail decisions that the home office made? 
 
Well, no, obviously I didn’t agree with what they were saying. I’m not sure if I can answer 
that question. Did I tend to agree with what the home office decided on bail? Erm, I don’t 
know, there’s too many cases to consider. 
 
9. Sometimes they would refuse bail because they thought they would abscond, from 
that angle, did you ever come across a case where you thought the home office was making 
the right decision that they may abscond, or that the evidence was substantive enough? 
 
I don’t think – sorry, it’s slightly hazy in my mind. I don’t think you can oppose bail. I don’t 
think you can, I don’t think the home office need to ask you that this person’s going to 
abscond to keep them in, sorry, to keep them in fast track. I don’t think it’s an absconding 
issue; I think it’s whether they meet the criteria for, a quick decision. 
 
10. So maybe I’m confusing it with – when they’ve finished the DFT and they’ve got a 
negative decision, then it’s different. 
 
Yes I think the procedure is: during the DFT process, special conditions for bail exist, a lower 
threshold for detention exists, as per the decision of Saadi, but once they’ve finished that 
process then the normal conditions for bail exist again. Then they then do include, erm, 
absconding. In those situations, if we did apply for bail – so you’re contemplating someone 
applying for bail, having been refused, presumably, their asylum claim? 
 
11. Yeah, I guess if you were working in legal aid you wouldn’t have worked with many 
people who had been appeals right exhausted on the DFT and were, erm, therefore detained 
under different criteria? 
If they’re just awaiting removal, having been on the DFT, and then they’re still in 
Harmondsworth, erm, then I mean certainly immediately any chance of getting bail would 
recede to a very small probability, if they are completely appeal rights exhausted and there’s 
no possibility of a fresh claim, because they’re just waiting to be gotten rid of again. But if 
they don’t get removed after – I think I used to advise people that if they hadn’t been 
removed within a month, erm, contact me and we’ll see if it’s worth getting bail – but you’d 
need surety.  
12. So I suppose you didn’t do that many bail cases after… 
 
I mean a person in those circumstances really wouldn’t have much chance of getting bail, so I 
mean we wouldn’t – you can’t make a bail application on legal aid unless you think there’s at 
least a 50% chance of it working, because of the criteria for controlled equal representation. 
13. I don’t know if you have looked at the detention action judgment, the case that was 
heard last year, and the judgment came through in July. 
(Laughs). I think I should have seen it, but I haven’t. 
(Cont.) It just said that the detainee fast track procedure was lawful in theory, but the way it 
was operating in practice was unlawful at the moment. But that doesn’t mean that it can’t act 
as a lawful means. They said that the way to make it lawful would be time have more time 
with your solicitor, between the screening and the substantive. And I read something on the 
detention action website that they’re suggesting 4 clear days with your lawyer before the 
substantive interview, in order to make the whole process lawful and fair. Do you think that 
four days before the substantive interview is enough time to prepare everything to give 
yourself the best chance to prepare your case, or do you feel it’s not enough? 
Ok, I think four days would be a spectacular improvement on what currently goes on. But, 
it’s hard to say. It would definitely be a massive step in the right direction. 
14. In your experience, on average, how much time did you have with your clients when 
you were working with them? 
Erm, prior to the beginning of the interview. Sometimes literally less than an hour.  
15. Was there ever a problem with understanding what they were saying, or were you 
always given an interpreter? 
 
Erm, it would be our responsibility to get an interpreter. They send you a pro forma fax and it 
would tell you what the language was and then you’d call up your interpreter for that 
language. 
16. So less than an hour, you can’t do anything can you?! 
It’s really just enough time to introduce yourself, explain how the interview works, and get 
the forms signed. But it’s not enough time to obviously explore the claim, or give them any 
useful advice about asylum law, other than the most general terms. 
17. So often they would not say their case properly, or they would omit things that you 
think they should’ve emphasised and things like that? 
 
Well, you would be hearing the details of their claim for the first time during the interview. 
18. Have you heard about the opening of the HMP The Verne. The prison called The 
Vern. It used to be a prison and then they said ‘ok we’re going to turn it into a detention 
centre for ex-offenders’ and a week before hand they changed their mind, and they said ‘no, 
no we’re going to keep it as a prison’!  
 
I haven’t heard of that prison at all. 
19. Ok,  last question, I wanted to ask your opinion on the 2014 immigration bill that was 
passed I think in May. Do you see it making any changes to things? 
I think it’s quite definite what it’s going to do. Do I see it making any changes? I’ve studied 
the whole act. There’s about 115 sections so way too much to discuss in a phone call. I would 
say that, erm, obviously the loss of appeal rights for almost all non-asylum is devastating to 
the whole rule of law. Something which fewer people are talking about is, erm, the way in 
which an asylum claim is now going to be made. There is provision, the last time I looked at 
the act my understanding was that in order to make – I mean currently an asylum claim is 
defined to be a claim which is made at a designated place, which is: ASE Croydon, ASE 
Liverpool, or at a port and essentially the same thing is going to happen to a human rights 
claim, so you’re going to have to be there in person at a designated place (which is probably 
going to be Croydon) to make a human rights claim, so the idea will be if you want to be 
grubby and rely on human rights (because it’s a dirty word) they’re going to make you sit 
down at Croydon for hours like all the other asylum seekers, erm, I think it’s very worrying 
because that effectively means that you can’t submit human rights based representations on 
paper, in normal paper applications anymore, so that will be devastating. And especially 
without any legal aid, because people aren’t going to know how to, so you’re not going to be 
able to make it in writing, you’re going to have to make it in person, but you don’t have any 
legal aid to bring the lawyer along to Croydon to help you do that either so it’s going to be 
incredibly difficult. 
Thank you very much for your time and for speaking to me today. 
No problem. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Appendix 4 
 
Nathalie Lieven, (Barrister A) 
6th September, 2014, via telephone 
 
1. Hi Nathalie, thank you so much for agreeing to speak to me today.  Have you managed to 
look at the consent form that I have sent across? 
No, sorry I haven’t looked, what do I have to consent to? 
 
2. Don’t worry I know you’re busy.  It just confirmed who I am and the purpose of this 
interview today.  It also confirmed that the interview would be completely confidential, and 
any ideas from you that I use in my work will be completely confidential.  You can stop the 
interview at any time. 
That’s fine.  I’ll send the form through later. 
 
3. Thanks.  So the first question I had.  In the DA v SSHD judgment I noticed that the judge 
said that the DFT couldn’t operate just as fast as the home office could get it to operate.  But 
it wasn’t prepared to say that is was inefficient on the evidence given at the hearing.  I 
wondered if you could comment on that because I thought that the evidence was quite 
compelling. 
Well, the evidence was compelling I think on inefficiency, but I think that it is a really 
difficult question about a point to which inefficiency becomes illegality.  I mean I think that 
I’m not sure you completely understand that there were effectively 2 separate arguments in 
the case, one was unacceptable unfairness leading to unlawful policy, and the other was 
unlawful detention.  Now it seems to me analytically that there are a lot of tension between 
the 2 because of course in some ways the unfairness arose from the speed.  But the result of 
saying we want less speed, is it means we need… they should be detained for longer.  
Potentially.  So I this the depar… the Home Office’s inefficiency really went to the unlawful 
detention point because what we said was well you can’t hold onto these people much much 
longer than Saadi, justify their detention on the basis of Saadi in this process when actually 
you’re not doing anything on the process.  Um, but we didn’t kind of want to push too hard 
on you can only detain them on… because it’s for three days.  In Saadi, they were actually 
doing a much faster process, I mean, because we looked at this at the court of appeal I mean 
people were coming in and going out in 48 hours.  The lawyers were seeing them in the 
morning and they were being determined, the decision interview was in the afternoon.  So I 
don’t think that the Home Office’s inefficiency in terms of just not… because one of the 
major bits of evidence which very much came out of John Vine’s report was um they were 
putting people into fast track and then they were just sitting on it for 10 days doing absolutely 
nothing.  Now it doesn’t seem to me that goes with the unlawfulness on unfairness grounds, it 
potentially goes to the unlawful detention grounds.  But the judge didn’t really rule on the 
unlawful detention grounds.  He avoided that issue.  Um, and I think the difficulty although 
I’m quite critical of the judge avoiding the issue and indeed we are appealing on part of the 
unlawful detention grounds, we are hearing next month.  I think it would be quite, I think the 
Home Office’s inefficiency in inexcusable, but it would be quite difficult to argue that it 
automatically gave rise to an unlawful detention.  It seems to me that that is very case specific 
and so quite difficult to take on a generic level that X days is unlawful detention.  That’s a 
very very long answer to your question!   
 
4. (Laughs) Don’t worry it’s very useful!  I notice in the judgment the judge refers to the fact 
the whole process should take 20 days with the inclusion of appeals.  Did you feel that he 
addressed the circumstances surrounding the inclusion of appeals on the fast track detention 
criteria properly?  
Well that is the point, that’s the only substantive point in the judgment we are appealing.  
And there is a hearing next month about that.  And we say in terms no he didn’t address it 
properly.  Because the Sec… as you’ll have picked up from the judgment, the Secretary of 
State’s position on detaining during the appeals process is a complete mess so he finds… can 
I just have a second while I dig around to find the judgment (sure sorry) … he finds in terms 
that the original policy as set out by the minister was not to detain people through the appeal 
process.  And then he says well there was a change in 2008 and then the policy became to 
detain people all the way through.  Now, the first point is, there is no evidence of that change, 
he just made that up.  The only evidence, sorry I’ve just said there was no evidence and the 
offered evidence which is inconsistent, the sum total of the evidence is an additional sentence 
in a subsidiary policy document which doesn’t change the principle document which makes it 
clear that detention is only during the decision making and not during the appeal.  So his 
basis of finding a change doesn’t stack up.  Secondly the Secretary of State didn’t say there 
was a change in 2008 she said the policy all the way through was to detain on appeal.  So 
there is an inconsistency between her position and the judge’s position.  And then thirdly the 
judge says well I haven’t seen any justification for this but it’s a matter for a different case, 
and he says that the justification would basically be the same.  But that simply isn’t right 
because the justification for detaining people during the decision making is what is set out in 
Saadi which is you know they need to be there so that they can be interviewed quickly so the 
Home Office can you timetable interviews so the whole process can be shot through really 
fast.  But for an appeal, none of that applies.  The only thing that person has to turn up for is 
the appeal hearing.  And if they don’t turn up for the appeal hearing, then it can be… it can 
go ahead without them.  So you don’t have to be detained onsite for your appeal, it’s not 
necessary.  The justifications in Saadi don’t run.  And also, I said to the court of appeal, there 
is a sort of … the really important point here which is basically one party to litigation is 
detaining the other party to the litigation, enormously to that second party’s disadvantage 
because it is much more difficult to run an appeal if you’re in detention, because your access 
to your lawyers and your evidence is so restricted.  And you know the idea that the 
justification is the same just can’t be right.  Um, there might be,… and of course it’s really 
important to remember at this stage, that they can go on detaining people on normal detention 
criteria.  So if they think someone’s an absconsion risk, then they can go on detaining them.  
Nobody’s ever argued about that.  The point about DFT is that they have the power to detain 
people who aren’t abscond risks.  So I felt that, well I have to say it was mainly Charlotte I 
was slightly bemused but, we come to the conclusion that the judge got this wrong, um and 
we’d got good ground for appeal. 
 
5. And we are not waiting for the result of that? 
Well what happened was, we have an appeal hearing on relief, on the I think it was the 29th 
August, but the court of appeal judges didn’t realise that we were also appealing this point 
about unlawful detention on appeal… during the appeal period.  So they said they didn’t have 
enough time to listen to that argument so the appeal has been split.  So the hearing on the 
substantive appeal on the point that we have just been going through is sometime at the end 
of October sometime, but we are awaiting the judgment on the appeal that we heard at the 
end of August. 
 
6. The judge found that the Rule 35 was ineffective, the screening procedure needed to be 
improved, and more time was needed with the solicitor.  But he found that only one of these 
things needed to be improved in order to make the process lawful.  What was your reaction to 
that? 
Well yes hmm, I mean we what he says is that he goes through the failings and he says well 
that on its own doesn’t make it unlawful and that on its own doesn’t make it unlawful, and we 
always said that each of these failings don’t on its own make the process unlawful, we always 
said it was a combination.  To some degree he’s followed the analysis that we’ve followed, 
you know, it’s quite a complicated legal situation this unfairness this coz you’ve got lots of 
you know you can’t say … if the appeal process was much better then you know the failings 
of rule 35 wouldn’t matter so much.  So you can’t disaggregate the different bits.  I mean the 
judge was obviously desperate to try and minimise the damage but do something about the 
unfairness so he saw one way of saying well there are all these different bits, but if you just 
have more time with your lawyers, that can make everything else OK.  Um, it would have 
been better if he said: there are all these failings, what an improvement that could obviously 
be made if there was more time with the lawyers, but all the failings have to be looked at 
together.  That would have been better.  That would have been the order we would have liked 
him to make.  And I think the order that was justified on the evidence.  But we didn’t appeal 
because we took the view that given that he’d been the first instance judge and had made 
these findings, we were unlikely to get anything better out of the court of appeal, even though 
we might have got something better out of the High Court if we’d had a different judge in the 
first place, but you know, that’s the nature of litigation.  You have to deal with what you get.  
Um, but we argued in the court of appeal that on relief that the judge should have brought the 
whole system to a stop until the unfairness had been remedied.  In the remedy judgement, he 
says ‘at the present time the unlawfulness hasn’t been remedied’.  It’s about is 4 days enough 
etc which is relevant to your question. 
 
7. Would you say that a different type of screening interview is needed to the one that is 
being used at the moment?  
Well the problem with that is that there are very very different views within the claimant 
community – the immigration lawyers’ community as to whether you should do more at 
screening… part of the problem is, particularly for vulnerable claimants, you know women 
who have been tortured or raped or whatever, they’re just not going to be able to talk at that 
first screening interview.  So you can improve screening, but it’s never going to be a whole 
answer. 
 
8. With regard to the nationality list, it emerged that there was a RAG list that was 
unpublished which was used in decision-making, is that why the issue was not found unfair 
by the judge? 
Well, they said that it’s not a nationality list.  It’s just a help I mean it’s just to help the 
application of policy (paragraph 91 of the judgment).  And um in some ways it didn’t help us 
to say that there was a nationality list.  We said one of the major changes since Saadi was that 
there wasn’t a nationality list.  So the judge was in a bit of a cleft stick because he couldn’t 
find there was a nationality list without it falling foul of Lumba, but it was a policy that 
wasn’t published.  So, but also to look at the reality of it, in Saadi the nationality list was 
about effectively are these people likely to have good asylum claims, so it was you know safe 
country not safe country kind of analysis.  The RAG list was really about whether you could 
remove people or not.  So Pakistan I think was either Green or Amber, now nobody was 
suggesting that Pakistan particularly for women was a great place to be, but it is a place that 
people can be removed to.  So the RAG list was doing a different function from the old 
nationality list.  I think we said that it was an unpublished policy and then contrary to Lumba, 
but I think, it wasn’t entirely clear that that was the case.  The judge found that the test in 
Lumba is satisfied.  And also part of the difficulty was that I think by the time we got to 
court, everybody knew about the RAG list and it wasn’t really unpublished anyway, I think 
they do now publish or semi-publish it. 
 
9.  My last question is about the conditions of detention.  I felt that the conditions of detention 
were completely contrary to Saadi not just a little bit and I felt like he skipped over that fact. 
Yes we I certainly felt he skipped over it.  However, the Secretary of State is being quite 
clever here; she gets the principle approved in Saadi and then she moves to something very 
different.  But it would be hard to win on that point in the European Court because you know 
the conditions of detention here are about 5 million times better than they are in France or 
Italy.  Let alone Greece.  So, and to be honest the time periods are relatively short.  And you 
know, it’s not really going to run that point really.  So although he did skip over it, I think the 
conditions of detention would have to be worse before a breach of article 5 would be found 
I’m afraid.  Well you might get a different answer from someone who has experience 
immigration more, but I do work for the prison section of the MoJ and the prison system is a 
lot worse.  And I know that there’s a difference because those are the people who have 
committed criminal offences, but even though they were completely different from Saadi, 
you’re completely right on that, they weren’t bad enough to trigger an article 5 complaint. 
Thank you so much for your time, it’s been really useful./ No problem happy to help. 
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 Appendix 6 
 
Consent Form 
 
My name is Jessica Vicary.  I am an MA student at the Institute of Commonwealth Studies, 
University of London.  I am conducting research on immigration detention in the UK, with a 
focus on unlawful detention.  I plan to write a dissertation based in part on what you and 
others tell me in these interviews. 
 
If you agree to be interviewed, we will talk about events that have occurred, as well as your 
attitudes to and opinions on the subject.  As we talk, I may take written notes about our 
conversation so I can remember the most important parts after I leave. 
 
Your participation in this interview is completely voluntary.  If I ask a question that you do 
not want to answer, you do not have to answer.  If, at any time, you want to stop the 
interview, you can tell me and we will stop.  There is no problem if you choose not to 
participate or to stop the interview.  It is completely your choice. 
 
I will make every effort to protect your privacy at all times.  I will not use your name or 
linked institution(s) in anything I write in this study and I will not tell anyone that I 
interviewed you or what we talked about.   
 
Please certify that you have read and understood this statement and that you give consent to 
be interviewed. 
 
Consent Given via telephone after viewing consent form over emails (signature) 
15.09.14 (date) 
 
Alex Finch_________________________________________ (printed name) 
(Solicitor B) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Appendix 7 
 
Consent Form 
 
My name is Jessica Vicary.  I am an MA student at the Institute of Commonwealth Studies, 
University of London.  I am conducting research on immigration detention in the UK, with a 
focus on unlawful detention.  I plan to write a dissertation based in part on what you and 
others tell me in these interviews. 
 
If you agree to be interviewed, we will talk about events that have occurred, as well as your 
attitudes to and opinions on the subject.  As we talk, I may take written notes about our 
conversation so I can remember the most important parts after I leave. 
 
Your participation in this interview is completely voluntary.  If I ask a question that you do 
not want to answer, you do not have to answer.  If, at any time, you want to stop the 
interview, you can tell me and we will stop.  There is no problem if you choose not to 
participate or to stop the interview.  It is completely your choice. 
 
I will make every effort to protect your privacy at all times.  I will not use your name or 
linked institution(s) in anything I write in this study and I will not tell anyone that I 
interviewed you or what we talked about.   
 
Please certify that you have read and understood this statement and that you give consent to 
be interviewed. 
 
Consent given via telephone after reading the consent form (signature)     06.09.14 (date) 
 
Nathalie Lieven_________________________________________ (printed name) 
(Barrister A) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Appendix 8 
 
   
 Direct Communications Unit 
2 Marsham Street 
London  
SW1P 4DF 
Tel: 020 7035 4848 
Fax: 020 7035 4745 
www.homeoffice.gov.uk 
 
jessicavicary@gmail.com 
FAO Jessica  
Reference: T10300/14       20 August  2014 
 
Dear Jessica, 
 
Thank you for your e-mail of 30 July to the Home Office about your request for an interview 
with the Home Secretary or another Minister, in relation to your dissertation.  Your e-mail 
has been passed to the Direct Communications Unit and I have been asked to reply. 
 
Unfortunately, due to heavy diary commitments, the Ministers are not able to agree to your 
request for an interview.   
 
I am sorry that we are unable to be of assistance on this occasion. 
 
Yours sincerely, 
 
J Jones 
E-mail: Public.Enquiries@homeoffice.gsi.gov.uk 
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2 (Detention Action, 2011: 11) 
Appendix 10 
 
Percentage of those being removed from the fast track before the initial decision3 
 
Year Harmondsworth (men) Yarl’s Wood (women) 
2008 13% 26% 
2009 16% 28% 
2010 17% 25% 
2011 16% 30% 
2012 14% 21% 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
3 (Home Office Statistics, Q2 2014, as_12) 
Appendix 114 
 
94 Appeal from within United Kingdom: unfounded human rights or asylum claim 
 
(1)This section applies to an appeal under section 82(1) where the appellant has made an 
asylum claim or a human rights claim (or both). 
[F1(1A)A person may not bring an appeal against an immigration decision of a kind specified 
in section 82(2)(c), (d) or (e) in reliance on section 92(2) if the Secretary of State certifies that 
the claim or claims mentioned in subsection (1) above is or are clearly unfounded.] 
(2)A person may not bring an appeal to which this section applies [F2in reliance on section 
92(4)(a)] if the Secretary of State certifies that the claim or claims mentioned in subsection 
(1) is or are clearly unfounded. 
(3)If the Secretary of State is satisfied that an asylum claimant or human rights claimant is 
entitled to reside in a State listed in subsection (4) he shall certify the claim under subsection 
(2) unless satisfied that it is not clearly unfounded. 
(4)Those States are— 
(a)-(i)F3. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
 [F4(k)the Republic of Albania, 
(l)F5. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
(m)F6. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
(n)Jamaica, 
(o)Macedonia, 
(p)the Republic of Moldova, and 
(q)F5. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .] 
[F7(r)F8. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
(s)Bolivia, 
(t)Brazil, 
(u)Ecuador, 
(v)F9. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
(w)South Africa, and 
(x)Ukraine.] 
[F10(y)India.] 
[F11(z)Mongolia, 
(aa)Ghana (in respect of men), 
(bb)Nigeria (in respect of men).] 
[F12(cc)Bosnia-Herzegovina, 
(dd)Gambia (in respect of men), 
(ee)Kenya (in respect of men), 
(ff)Liberia (in respect of men), 
(gg)Malawi (in respect of men), 
(hh)Mali (in respect of men), 
(ii)Mauritius, 
(jj)Montenegro, 
(kk)Peru, 
(ll)Serbia, 
(mm)Sierra Leone (in respect of men). 
 
                                                          
4 S. 94 (1-4) of Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002 
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Table as_01: Asylum applications for main applicants compared with DFT 
applicants, by country of nationality6 
 
Year 
Geographical 
region Country of nationality 
 Total 
applications  
Percentage 
total 
annual 
increase/ 
decrease 
Percentage 
DFT 
annual 
intake 
increase/ 
decrease7 
2013 *Total *Total 23,584 .. .. 
2013 Asia Afghanistan 1,038 +3% -25% 
2013 Asia Bangladesh 1,123 +6.2% +99% 
2013 Asia China 739 -6.2% +113% 
2013 Africa Nigeria 931 -3% +44% 
2013 Asia Pakistan 3,359 +2.4% +93% 
2013 Asia Sri Lanka 1,811 +4% +225% 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
6 (Home office Statistics, Q1 2014, as_01)  
7 (Home Office statistics, Q2 2014, as_11) 
Appendix 14 
Percentage of those being removed from the fast track before the initial decision8 
Year Harmondsworth (men) Yarl’s Wood (women) 
2008 13% 26% 
2009 16% 28% 
2010 17% 25% 
2011 16% 30% 
2012 14% 21% 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
8 (Home Office Statistics, Q2 2014, as_12) 
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9 FOI 32289, 29.07.14 
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People leaving detention by Reason by length of detention in 2013 
     
Length of Detention 
Remove
d from 
UK 
Granted 
leave to 
enter/remai
n 
Granted 
temporary 
entry/releas
e or Bailed 
Total 
A: 3 days or less 5,390 74 2,201 7,665 
B: 4 to 7 days 1,385 15 1,441 2,841 
C: 8 to 14 days 1,791 38 1,585 3,414 
D: 15 to 28 days 1,949 35 2,472 4,456 
E: 29 days to less than 2 months 2,921 41 2,636 5,598 
F: 2 months to less than 3 months 1,628 11 1,041 2,680 
G: 3 months to less than 4 months 806 3 478 1,287 
H: 4 months to less than 6 months 597 2 364 963 
I: 6 months to less than 12 
months 369 3 274 646 
J: 12 months to less than 18 
months 58 2 80 140 
K: 18 months to less than 24 
months 18 0 36 54 
L: 24 months to less than 36 
months 9 0 27 36 
M: 36 months to less than 48 
months 3 0 5 8 
N: 48 months or more 1 0 4 5 
Total 16,925 224 12,644 
29,79
3 
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